The new Standard Model of Ancient History? An enquiry into the applicability of the Cognitive Science of Religion in the origin and flourishing of the Hellenistic and Roman ruler cults by Groot, Charlotte Dieudonnée
LEIDEN UNIVERSITY 
The new Standard Model of Ancient 
History? 
An enquiry into the applicability of the Cognitive 
Science of Religion in the origin and flourishing of 
the Hellenistic and Roman ruler cults 
 
C.D. Groot 
22-6-2015 
 
 
 
Supervisor: F.G. Naerebout 
Johan Huizingagebouw, room 1.71a 
 
 
 
Student number 1020870 
Research Master Ancient History 
 lotte-groot@outlook.com 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
Contents 
Introduction ............................................................................................................................................. 3 
Chapter 1: The road goes ever on and on, out from the door where it began ....................................... 9 
Section 1.1: Sketching a picture .......................................................................................................... 9 
Section 1.2: Colouring the picture ..................................................................................................... 13 
Section 1.2.1: To make a mountain out of a molehill ................................................................... 14 
Section 1.2.2: Or perhaps not........................................................................................................ 20 
Chapter 2: A new method ..................................................................................................................... 23 
Chapter 3: Putting it into practice ......................................................................................................... 40 
Section 3.1: Ptolemy and Seleucus .................................................................................................... 40 
Section 3.2: Rome’s Princeps ............................................................................................................ 55 
Conclusion: ............................................................................................................................................ 72 
Bibliography:.......................................................................................................................................... 77 
Index of primary sources: .................................................................................................................. 82 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
Introduction 
The existence of religion is, as one can imagine one of the most hotly debated and controversial 
discussions around. The outcome of the discussion, should there ever be one, can have 
consequences for virtually everyone on the planet. It is no wonder then, that there is a general lack 
of consensus about the origin and prospering of religion. But what possible explanations for the 
origin of religion are there? And why, after its genesis, do certain religious ideas flourish? These 
questions are as pertinent for currently existing religions as for those of the past. I am certain that 
most readers will have their own suspicions as to why religions come into existence and why they 
flourish. It are precisely these that Pascal Boyer, who is one of the experts in the study of the 
inception of religion, notes as some of the most common misunderstandings about the origin of 
religion and, following that line, why it prospers.1 It is an interesting exercise to start with these, to 
see if your own views are among them and why they, possibly, do not work as well as one might have 
thought. 
 Shortly summarized, Boyer distinguishes four main forms under which most of the views can 
be classified. Please note that these do not necessarily represent the opinions of the scientific 
community, but also those of the ‘man in the street’, so to say. The first is that religion provides 
explanations for general intellectual concerns humans have. If we can explain a phenomena, we can 
predict it and attempt to control it. Religion provides these explanations and has therefore been 
created by men out of an intellectual need.2 At first this might sound like a logical explanation, 
perhaps because it harnesses the same feelings that might have prompted the reader to start 
reading Boyer’s book, or this thesis, in the first place. That is: curiosity. Yet if one thinks on this 
account some more, problems start to show. For instance, not all cultures have the same need for 
explanations.3 The origin of the world, misfortune or mankind are not represented at all in some 
known religions and can therefore not serve as a good account of the functioning of religion as a 
whole.4 Additionally, any explanation that religion does provide for occurrences usually leaves 
something to be desired. As Boyer remarks, to explain something like thunder for instance as the 
booming voices of gods or ancestors, we must assume the existence of a ‘whole imaginary world 
with superhuman agents (Where did they come from? Where are they?) that cannot be seen (Why 
not?) in a distant place that cannot be reached (How does the noise come through all the way?), 
whose voices produce thunder (How is that possible? Do they have special mouths? Are they 
                                                          
1
 P. Boyer, Religion Explained. The Human Instincts that Fashion Gods, Spirits and Ancestors (London 2001), 1-
57. 
2
 Boyer, Religion Explained, 12-14. 
3
 Ibidem, 14-15. 
4
 Ibidem, 15. For a good overview of different religions practiced in modern times, J. Bowen, Religions in 
Practice. An approach to the anthropology of religion (Boston 1998). 
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gigantic?).’5 The point being that this kind of situation often leads to more questions than answers 
and the construction needed to sustain the explanation will only get more extensive as time goes on. 
So the conclusion that the origin and success of religion lies in the fact that the human mind 
demands explanation is not completely satisfactory. However, it cannot be denied that religions do 
function as givers of information, even if the construction needed to sustain this is very extensive. 
More complex problems such as starvation, evil, or even why the world exists, also need explanation 
and these need not be simple. 
 The second category that Boyer identifies, sees the origin and function of religion as 
something that provides comfort. Rather than for our rational state of being, we need religion for our 
emotional one. The most prominent example is of course that of salvation religions, which relieve the 
fear of death by offering a better place beyond the grave. Life can be full of frightful and nasty things 
and religion can relieve some of those anxieties. While again, at first sight, it seems to function fairly 
well as explanation, upon further inspection Boyer claims that problems begin to show themselves. 
For instance fears are culturally based and the rituals that are used to alleviate the fears often create 
the need that they seek to fulfil.6 That is, one culture could possess an entire system against the 
threat of demons (rituals, amulets and the like), yet another society may have none of these fears. 
The existence of the ritual in all likelihood reinforces the need for protection from said demons. Very 
often religious people feel that the odds are increasingly stacked against them and that the 
supernatural powers, that seek to harm them, cannot be completely warded off. Evidence for bad 
fortune is all around them (accidents or death) and it only makes them more fearful of the world 
they live in. Concerning the fear of death the same thing applies as it did for ‘religion as an 
explanation’, that is not all cultures have this concern.7 Mortality, for all, is simply inevitable, 
however this need not be the end for some.8 But, again it is quite undeniable that religion does 
alleviate fears even when it might partly cause them. Though it might not be its primary cause or 
objective. 
 The third category of these theories centres on the need for religion in society. The 
foundation for this theory is certainly no mystery. In most societies, religion forms the backbone of 
how people interact with each other and what place they take in said society. That is, in all cases 
religion is strongly connected with moral believes and social stratification. However, religion does not 
create these things. They exist already, religion simply gives an ad hoc explanation for why the 
currents system is in place. All societies have some form of prescriptive rules governing social 
                                                          
5
 Boyer, Religion Explained, 15. 
6
 Ibidem, 22-23. 
7
 Note that fear of death is not the same as the biologically ingrained survival instinct, which is of course a pan-
human concern. We return to this below. 
8
 Ibidem, 22-26. 
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organization, their religious concepts however, can differ vastly.9 On the other hand, religion is most 
assuredly connected to the functioning of society and morality and could play a part in how we 
acquire it. This is the first point that Boyer believes should be an element that needs to be 
represented in any theory concerning religion, its origin and its thriving. I agree with him in this, but 
also believe that the above views should be represented in any theory. 
 The final category of explanations for the origin and the enthusiastic continuation of religion 
is one that sees religion as a manner of error in our mental functioning. People are by their very 
nature superstitious, also religious concepts are not refutable by rational reasoning and besides, it 
would be therefore be too much effort to even try. Some of these claims are of course reasonable, 
one cannot, for instance, verify religious claims. The processes and agents their existence cannot be 
proven in any way, it is after all a matter of belief. Humans are also prone to believing in religious 
elements, however this is limited in certain ways.10 This is a point we shall return to below. As we 
shall see in chapter 2, a theory of the origin and prospering of religion, should certainly take into 
account the fact that the human mind is receptive to only specific forms of religious belief and not to 
others. 
Were your own views mentioned above? And, if so, are you convinced that they perhaps rest 
upon a misunderstanding of the phenomenon? What was the point of the exercise above, you ask? 
To attempt to show that current theories might not function as fully as you believe and to present an 
alternative. This alternative could very well take the form of cognitive science. Cognitive science is 
the interdisciplinary and scientific investigation of the mind and intelligence. Its advantages are that 
it focusses on general ‘laws’ of thinking that follow out of the structure of our brains. To minimize the 
influence of culture in the inquiries testing is partly done with children, in whom cultural influence is 
minimal. It follows then, that these are theories that should be applicable across cultures and, since 
the structure of our brains has not evolved since the beginning of history (ca. 3000 B.C.), they are 
also applicable through time. Although cognitive science is not without its controversies and 
encompasses several competing research traditions that differ from each other primarily in their 
ideas of the nature of mental representations and of the procedures by which such representations 
are manipulated.11 We will go into cognitive science more extensively below (chapter 2), but for now 
let me elucidate why cognitive science (or more specifically the cognitive science of religion) is the 
subject of this research. 
                                                          
9
 Boyer, Religion Explained, 26-32. 
10
 Ibidem, 32-35. 
11
 P. Thagard, ‘Cognitive science. Approaches’, in: The Encyclopædia Britannica ed., Britannica.com, 2013, 6-3-
2014. 
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Cognitive science has been on the upswing, however its promise has barely seeped over into 
other areas of study which could result in a multi-disciplinary approach to some topics.12 As one can 
imagine studies in history could have a lot to gain, if cognitive science can live up to its promise. For 
the biggest issue for historians is that there is a great amount of information from the past, but no 
single way of interpreting this. Historian L.H. Martin likens it to the children’s’ game of ‘connecting 
the dots’, which I am sure we are all familiar with. In the game a child (or adult if it tickles their fancy) 
connects the numbered dots on the paper to form an image.13 This image can be recreated by any 
who plays the game, as the order of the dots does not change. So if we imagine that the individual 
dots each represent a piece of historical evidence and the lines between them their relation in our 
historical narrative we can imagine what Martin means with this metaphor. However, it becomes 
more difficult in the historians case, because, unlike in the child’s game, our dots are not numbered. 
Consequently, different players of the game might connect the dots in vastly different ways, which 
greatly influences what picture emerges from it.14 How a scholar connects these dots is influenced by 
all sorts of things; one’s own culture, political preferences, upbringing and schooling. Cognitive 
science could help in providing a framework in which these theories can function, by indicating what 
is even humanly possible to think based on the structure of the brain. It could perhaps, even suggest 
the most likely theories that can be discovered in certain tendencies the human mind has. 
However, as mentioned before, it has not been implemented in a consistent manner in 
historical studies, while this could in fact provide a key to understanding historical events better. But 
are cognitive theories indeed useful in looking at historical events? And do they enhance our 
understanding in matters where, up till now, there has been no consensus? This will be the focus of 
this research and to answer this question we will examine a certain historical event in which no 
consensus has been reached. The historical event under investigation will be the origin and 
flourishing of the Hellenistic and Roman ruler cults. To understand this, a short introduction is not 
out of place. 
We start with Plutarch’s story about Alexander the Great, who received an oracle in the Siwa 
oasis in Egypt that his lineage was divine, to illustrate. 
 
“And some say that the prophet, wishing to show his friendliness by addressing him with ‘O 
paidion,’ or O my son, in his foreign pronunciation ended the words with ‘s’ instead of ‘n,’ 
                                                          
12
 L.H. Martin, ‘The Future of the Past: The History of Religions and Cognitive Historiography’, Religio, Vol. 20.2 
(2012), 163. 
13
 Martin, ‘The Future of the Past’, 159. 
14
 Ibidem, 159-160. 
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and said, ‘O paidios,’ and that Alexander was pleased at the slip in pronunciation, and a story 
became current that the god had addressed him with ‘O pai Dios,’ or O son of Zeus.” 15 
 
Although Plutarch clearly expresses his doubt concerning the rightfulness of the oracle, Alexander 
the Great would, bolstered by this validation of his divinity, go on to conquer the Persian Empire, 
cumulating in the battle at Gaugamela (331 BC). After his death in 323 BC his kin and generals tried 
to establish themselves as the sole successor to his empire. However, none of them could achieve 
this and the land was divided into three kingdoms; the Antigonid dynasty in Macedonia and Greece, 
the Seleucids in Asia Minor, Mesopotamia, Syria and Persia and the Ptolemaic dynasty in Egypt, 
Palestine and Cyprus.16 
Greeks and Macedonians were now the rulers of oriental empires and were expected to act 
as the kings of old and yet they introduced innovations in this position as well. Their rule was often a 
fine balancing act between native and Greek elements, making sure that both groups found the new 
arrangement acceptable. It is in this situation that we first encounter a cult for the living ruler of the 
state. The definition that will be used for this research to identify the ruler cult is: a Hellenistic or 
Roman ruler who is viewed as a god and consequently receives some manner of cultic honouring 
during his lifetime. None of the cultures involved in the pre-Hellenistic countries had a tradition 
which entitled the living ruler to his (or her) own cult. Even in pharaonic Egypt, where one might 
expect a cult given the divine status of the ruler as the personification of the god Horus and keeper of 
Ma’at17, one does not find a ruler cult. Yet it soon becomes clear that Greeks and natives are, in fact, 
worshipping their foreign rulers as gods. The existence of these cults for the living ruler was 
something which might have inspired other empires to follow in their steps. The most significant of 
these was the Roman Empire. The sole rulers of the realm would soon install cults for their 
predecessors and expected the same to be done for them upon their own death. But more 
importantly for this research, there is talk of some rulers having cults during their lifetime, these 
were however mostly focused in the provinces, for in Rome there was firm resistance against it. 
However, there are certainly also some elements of the emperor that could be deified during his 
lifetime, without creating outrage.18 Interestingly, some people took issue with the deification of the 
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 Plutarch, Alexander 27.5 (translation: Perrin). 
16
 S. Price, ‘The history of the Hellenistic period’, in: J. Boardman, J. Griffin and O. Murray, The Oxford history of 
Greece and the Hellenistic world (Oxford 2001) 364-389, 365-368. 
17
 Ma’at was the ancient Egyptian concept of world order as opposed to Isfet (chaos). Only the pharaoh could 
maintain Ma’at by performing sacred tasks and thereby preventing the world from being destroyed by chaos. 
P. Herz, ‘Hellenistische Könige. Zwischen griechischen Vorstellungen vom Köningtum und Vorstellungen ihrer 
einheimischen Untertanen’, in: A. Small ed., Subject and ruler: the cult of the ruling power in classical antiquity 
(Ann Arbor, 1996) 27-40, 32-33. 
18
 Such as his numen, that is his divine power. We shall return to this more extensively below in chapter 3. 
8 
 
living rulers in both Hellenistic and Roman times, yet the majority of the population accepted the 
new cult without scruples and caused it to flourish. So how then can the tension between these two 
groups exist and what was the cause of it? 
The answers to these questions should enlighten the relationship between the rulers of 
ancient empires (both Hellenistic and Roman) and their subjects. The outcome could also lead 
scholars to a new interpretation of the position of the rulers within the Hellenistic and Roman 
empires. However, as indicated above, no consensus had been reached amongst the scholars 
investigating the Hellenistic and Roman ruler cults. The scholars of this debate can, I believe, be 
divided into two groups. The first group believes that the Greeks and Romans experienced no 
fundamental difference between their earlier situation and the new one, in which there was a 
worshipping of their living and deceased rulers. The ‘problem’ and the change was something 
modern scholars have created in their Judeo-Christian mind-set. However, seeing that ancient 
sources also remark upon the fundamental difference between the two, these theories will not hold 
up completely. The second group of scholars take this in their stride and recognize that there was 
indeed a fundamental difference. Yet, this was obviously overcome given our evidence. All off these 
theories, in different ways, are not adequate and there is no consensus. This will receive more 
extensive coverage below (chapter 1), however, the conclusion that must be acknowledged, is that 
all theories lack something. I would like to suggest that this lack in the explanation, for the 
phenomenon of the Hellenistic and Roman ruler cult, can perhaps be overcome with the help of 
cognitive science. This new theory will be the subject of chapter 2, where its framework will be 
expounded upon and its possibilities for the study of the Hellenistic and Roman ruler cults outlined. 
We will then try to apply this theory to two case studies, one will be the examination of the ruler cult 
in the Hellenistic (Ptolemaic and Seleucid) empires and the second will be of the ruler cult in Rome, 
particularly those of the emperors of the Principate (32 BC- 284 AD). By then it should have become 
clear whether or not the study of cognitive religion is a useful tool in trying to discover things about a 
long gone past. 
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Chapter 1: The road goes ever on and on, out from the door where 
it began 
This chapter will serve as the initiation into the subject under review, with all its problems and 
nuances. A research such as this would however not be complete without a little historical context. 
Although I am certain that any reader will be familiar with the period under observation, a short 
overview of said period, even if it only serves as to refresh it, would not be out of place. I will 
however, be brief about it as there are more important matters to consider. That will form the 
second part of this segment, which is a historiographical survey of the secondary material. We will 
examine numerous theories that make up the debate and consider their faults and strengths, to set 
the baseline for the following enquiry. 
Section 1.1: Sketching a picture 
As mentioned above our enquiry starts with the advent of the Hellenistic period, which of course 
starts with the death of Alexander the Great in 323 BC and the following conflict over his legacy. To 
go into it in any great detail would be impossible as whole shelves in the library have been filled with 
books on the history of the Hellenistic era. We will therefore focus on the transitional period after 
the death of Alexander, as it is then that the position of the Hellenistic rulers becomes clear. Of 
course, some remarks on later times will be added. 
 The death of Alexander left a great power vacuum in his still forming empire, which for all 
intents and purposes was not yet able to function as a state. There was no functioning government 
as many of the posts were empty upon his death, waiting to be filled. At the same time there was no 
fixed idea about how this government was going to look, other than an adapted form of the existing 
Persian structure.19 However, the most pertinent problem was the lack of an heir. Although 
Alexander’s wife was pregnant upon his death, the child was a far cry from inheriting the massive 
empire. The other option was Alexander’s half-brother, however the man was found to be mentally 
unfit to rule.20 A council was called and most of Alexander’s generals discuss the future of the empire 
and while some form of agreement was reached (they would wait until the pregnancy was done to 
make a decision and Perdikkas was given executive power in the meantime), it was hardly 
satisfactory. It is therefore no surprise that the army had a different idea and proclaimed Alexander’s 
half-brother king, despite whatever mental disability. However, this did not last as most individual 
generals were already setting themselves up for a bid at the throne and the Wars of the Diadochoi 
                                                          
19
 W. Adams, ‘The Hellenistic Kingdoms’, in: G. Bugh (ed.) The Cambridge Companion to the Hellenistic World 
(Cambridge, 2006), 28-51, 28-29. 
20
 The nature of this mental unfitness is unclear, as several ancient authors state different causes, but they all 
agree that he was mentally unsuitable for rulership. For instance in Plutarch the man is claimed to be a fool 
(Plut. Alex. 10.2), while Diodorus refers to an incurable mental illness (Diod. 18.2). 
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(Successors) soon became a fact.21 In practice the illusion of ruling in the name of the now born son 
of Alexander (Alexander IV) is upheld, but the empire soon splinters into smaller states. In fact the 
boy and his mother are murdered by 309 BC and in 306 BC the illusion is abandoned and Antigonos 
and his son Demetrius are crowned kings by their army.22 The other generals, not to be outdone, 
follow their example and the Hellenistic kingdoms are created. This was certainly not the end of the 
struggles between the Diadochoi, as the dream of reuniting Alexander’s empire under one single 
ruler remained alive, it was not until this goal seemed unattainable that we can discern several 
(somewhat fixed) states.23 Three major states now emerge; the Antigonid Empire in Macedonia, the 
Ptolemies in Egypt and the Seleucids in Asia. The two latter are the subject of this paper and we shall 
shortly go into them further. 
 All these nations had their specific advantages and disadvantages and these would define 
what kind of rule was possible for the Macedonian kings. The Ptolemaic Empire was defined by being 
easily defendable and very wealthy, as the Egyptian land provided both of these. Another advantage 
that presented itself to Ptolemy I was that the native Egyptians had a strong tradition of a powerful 
ruler, the pharaoh. It was a position he and his successors could easily claim and it gave them near-
absolute control of the nation. This large homogenous native population also meant that Ptolemy 
would have to conform to whatever image they had for their pharaoh, or risk riots in the land.24 
However, given the fact that he had many of his Greek and Macedonian soldiers with him as well as 
several Greek cities to rule in Egypt (Alexandria and Naucratis), he needed to be an acceptable king 
for these too, as it was the Greek population that the Ptolemaic rulers relied on for administration 
and military might. This split would lead to an interesting form of a dual identity for the kingship, 
which would always be a fine balancing act.25 And although the Ptolemaic Empire certainly did not 
have the largest armies at its disposal, its fabulous wealth, defendable position and their incredible 
control over the population would ensure that they were the longest standing Hellenistic Empire.26 
 The other Hellenistic subject empire under consideration is that of the Seleucids in Asia. 
Theirs was by far the largest empire of the three and it entitled them to massive amounts of 
resources. For not only could they extract tribute from many different peoples around their empire, 
they also controlled the major trading routes coming out of eastern Asia.27 Given their incredibly 
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 A helpful overview may be found in F. Chamoux, Hellenistic Civilization (translated by: M. Roussel) (Malden 
2003), 39-65. 
22
 Adams, ‘The Hellenistic Kingdoms’, 31-32. 
23
 Ibidem, 34-35. 
24
 Which did in fact happen later on under Ptolemy IV Philpator and cut the country in half for almost 20 years ( 
206-186 BC). For more information see: G. Hölbl, A history of the Ptolemaic Empire (translated by T. Saavedra), 
153-159. 
25
 Adams, ‘The Hellenistic Kingdoms’, 38-39. 
26
 Their fall was, of course, at the hands of Ocatvian (later Augustus), which we shall return to shortly below. 
27
 Ibidem, 43. 
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diverse population, the Seleucids could not uphold the same policy as the Ptolemaic rulers to deal 
with them. There was simply a too vast amount to install a Greek/Macedonian layer on top of them 
for administration and military purposes. They therefore resorted to increase their control through 
intermarriage and by giving natives in general a large part in the administration of the empire, as 
they had under Alexander.28 However, the empire soon proved too large to manage and the 
Seleucids were forced to give up several of their provinces or risk their forces being spread too thin.29 
Although the causes of the end of the Seleucid Empire are much disputed, Rome clearly had a 
deciding factor in the matter and took over some of the provinces from the Seleucids while the 
empire was still in existence.30 It is not difficult to imagine that, as the power of the Seleucid kings 
further waned, more area’s within the empire began to proclaim their independence until there was 
nothing left.31 
This then brings us to the Roman period, as the end of the Roman Republic is also the official 
‘end’ of the Hellenistic period. Rome, by this time, had conquered most of the Mediterranean, but 
was now struggling internally for its continuation. Political conflict was abound in the tumultuous 
first century BC, with the Social War in Italian Peninsula and the civil war that plagued Republican 
Rome until its collapse.32 It is in this century that the origins of the Roman Empire need to be sought. 
The lifelong elected dictatorship of Sulla and later Caesar gave unprecedented power to certain 
individuals which had never before been seen in the Roman political system.33 This however all came 
to a culmination under Augustus, who was born Octavian (23 September 63 BC – 19 August 14 AD). 
Octavian rose through the upper echelons of Roman political life at a very young age, partly through 
his connection with Julius Caesar, who was by that time the elected dictator for the Roman republic. 
This tenure would, in 45 BC, be extended to a lifelong one, something which was very much unheard 
of and a prelude to the position Octavian himself would soon hold.34 Caesar, as we all know, was 
murdered that very year in the assembly of the senate because he wanted to formalize his new 
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 Adams, ‘The Hellenistic Kingdoms’, 43-44. 
29
 Ibidem, 46-48. 
30
 S. Sherwin-White and A. Kuhrt, From Samarkhand to Sardis: a new approach to the Seleucid empire (London 
1993), 217-223. 
31
 Sherwin-White and Kuhrt, Samarkhand to Sardis, 225-228. 
32
 A helpful overview of this tumultuous period and its origins can be found in F.G. Naerebout and H.W. Singor, 
Antiquity, Greeks and Romans in Context (Malden 2014), 228-240. Another very extensive overview can be 
found in the Companion to the Roman Republic, more specifically: C.F. Konrad, ‘From the Grachi to the First 
Civil War (133-70)’, in: N. Rosenstein and R. Morstein-Marx, A Companion to the Roman Republic (Malden 
2006) 167-189. And W.J. Tatum, ‘The Final Crisis (69-44)’, in: N. Rosenstein and R. Morstein-Marx, A Companion 
to the Roman Republic (Malden 2006) 190-211.  
33
 For Sulla see for instance: A. Thein, ‘Sulla the weak tyrant’, in: S. Lewis ed., Ancient Tyranny (Edinburgh 2006) 
238-249, 240-242. For Caesar a useful article is; J.F. Gardner, ‘The Dictator’, in: M. Griffin ed., A companion to 
Julius Caesar (Malden 2009) 57-71, 57-60. 
34
 K. Galinsky, Augustus. Introduction to the life of an Emperor (Cambridge 2012), 14-15. 
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position in a monarchy which was modelled on, interestingly enough, the Hellenistic rulers.35 The 
young man would then ally himself with Lepidus and Mark Antony to punish the murderers of 
Caesar, only to later fall into war with both parties over the power in the realm.36 It is at this point 
that the final Hellenistic empire is about to come to an end. This end comes in the form of the naval 
battle of Actium, in which Mark Antony, his army and the Ptolemaic forces were defeated by 
Octavius (31 BC). The Ptolemaic Empire is now officially a province of the Roman state, although for 
the people very little change could be felt and as we shall see this even seeped into the religious 
structure.37 For the Roman state however, this event triggered the start of the Roman Empire. 
Octavian received ample reward for the defeat of Mark Anthony and his help in ‘restoring’ the 
Roman Republic and thus received the name Augustus. 
From 27 BC onwards Gaius Julius Caesar Octavianus, better known as Augustus ruled the 
Roman Empire. At first though, it was behind the facade of the ‘restored Republic’, which suited 
Roman conservatism.38 Augustus in the Res Gestae, makes a great show of rejecting any attempts by 
the senate and the people to give him sole rule.39 Augustus was Princeps, that is the first citizen of 
the Roman state, giving him unlimited power in the state in all actuality. However, it was not until 23 
BC that his power would be uncontested. He resigned his position as consul, a yearly position which 
he had held continuously since 27 BC, and was granted tribunicia potestas (the tribune of the people) 
by the senate. This allowed him to pass any legislation as he saw fit.40 Together with the power he 
held over the military, Augustus consolidated the position that many emperors would fill after him 
(albeit with regular changes in constitution and titles).41 The Roman Empire would, however, prove 
to be rather unstable as well, as the position of the Roman emperor did not rest on constitutional 
foundations, but on acclaim of the army. This meant that any with the backing of the army could be 
proclaimed ruler.42 Although it was certainly Augustus’ intention to create a dynastic succession, this 
would not be easy for those following him. They were very much limited to what heirs were available 
and we can see several changes in dynasty as factions of the army could not agree on the succession. 
These changes are certainly not always peaceful, the most prominent thing that comes to mind is the 
Year of the four Emperors. This was when, after Nero’s suicide, civil war broke out because there 
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 Naerebout and Singor, Antiquity, 238. 
36
 Ibidem, 238-240. The entire conflict is too large and detailed to discuss here with any justice. For further 
information on the matter Galinsky, Augutus, 20-60, gives a comprehensive overview. 
37
 Especially for the lower class masses not much change was felt, heavier taxation being perhaps the 
exception. Administration certainly saw its fair share of change and the elite were now themselves subject to a 
higher class of Romans. However, on the whole, the functioning of the state changed little. N. Lewis, Life in 
Egypt Under Roman Rule (Oxford 1983), 14-35. 
38
 Naerebout and Singor, Antiquity, 298-301. 
39
 Aug. Anc. 5-6. 
40
 Galinsky, Augutus, 72-73. B. Levick, Augustus. Image and Substance (Harlow 2010), 89-91. 
41
 Galinsky, Augutus, 73. 
42
 Naerebout and Singor, Antiquity, 302. 
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were several candidates for the throne and all had the backing of the army. The individual emperors 
were only in power for a short amount of time, no longer then a couple of months.43 The balance 
between the emperor and the senate was at this stage still very important and different rulers would 
interact differently with the senate, which influenced their style of ruling greatly. Some were openly 
defiant of the senate and its ‘power’ and it is they who are remembered as the tyrannical emperors 
(for instance, Nero and Gaius). While others were more subtle in proclaiming their powers and, 
arguably, got more done in the end (Augustus and Vespasian).44 Until 160 AD the Roman Empire 
flourished, afterwards it was under constant threat of invasion and the internal struggles only 
intensified at the end of the second century AD as strong and able emperors were increasingly 
replaced by megalomaniacs and poor leaders. This all culminated in the so-called crisis of the third 
century, in which the empire was showing certain signs of decline and change in general. Internal 
political instability was great and after the death of Emperor Alexander Severus in 235 AD another 
civil war broke out. Economic crisis, disease and invaders roamed the empire and reform was 
needed. This came during Diocletian’s reign (284-305 AD), who formally abolished the republic and 
instituted the Dominate. The emperor was now officially the absolute ruler of the empire and not 
merely the ‘first citizen’.45 
This is where our overview of Roman history stops, for it is at this time that Christianity was 
on the rise and it would become the dominant religion of the Roman Empire. This is, as one would 
suspect also the end of the deification of the emperor, as Christian Monotheism does not allow this 
position for any living man. How then does the ruler cult figure into this? Let us examine the theories 
in the debate about the matter. 
Section 1.2: Colouring the picture 
As mentioned, there is no consensus in the debate surrounding the flourishing of the Hellenistic and 
Roman ruler cult. The ongoing discussion stretches several decades and has many contributors. It 
would therefore be impossible for the purpose of this investigation to give an exhaustive overview of 
the entire debate, it is however my hope that this will be comprehensive enough to follow the course 
of the debate and illustrate that no agreement has yet been reached. It is also my intention to 
illustrate the weaknesses and strengths of these theories.  
To give structure to both this section and the debate, the theories on the origin of the ruler 
cult will be divided into two categories. These categories will be those who see continuity in the 
phenomenon and those who see discontinuity. This will necessarily mean that some theories are 
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simplified and perhaps distorted to be able to fit into our divisions. It is however, important to 
remember that these divisions merely serve as a heuristic devise to structure the debate and the 
underlying point of the section is to illustrate why the current theories do not solve our question. 
Before we start with our analysis another point must be made concerning our source 
material and the subjects of the theories. When reviewing the material for this research it soon 
became apparent that not all empires were equally well represented in both the sources and modern 
literature. The lack in the first is, of course, at least partly the cause for dearth in the second. The lack 
of evidence is especially troublesome when dealing with the Seleucid Empire and its ruler cult.46 
There is very little secondary material which focusses its explanations specifically on the Seleucid 
ruler cult. Theories on the Seleucid ruler cult can thus only be found in works which feature a general 
explanation for the Hellenistic ruler cult and give one (or perhaps two) examples of their theory for 
the Seleucid empire. However, the bulk of the support in evidence for the theory is found in the 
material for Ptolemaic Egypt, which is indeed abundant by ancient history standards. The Seleucid 
Empire will therefore, necessarily, be underrepresented in this section. The Roman ruler cult is 
equally well attested in the primary material and comprehensively represented in the secondary 
literature, although it brings with it some further problems of its own. Let us now then turn to the 
overview of the debate surrounding the origin of the Hellenistic and Roman ruler cult. 
Section 1.2.1: To make a mountain out of a molehill 
This section houses the theories of the scholars who see continuity in the practice of worshipping 
living men and rulers. The start of the practice is hotly debated, E. Badian for instance would argue 
that Alexander the Great was the first to be worshipped in such a way. 47 However, some scholars 
would certainly protest against this. A. Chaniotis gives numerous examples of individuals that 
precede Alexander that have been given divine honours during the lifetime.48 Such as the Spartan 
general Lysander, for whom the Samians erected an altar for sacrifices and renamed the festival of 
Hera to him (404 BC).49 Whichever the case, it is certainly clear that there is precedent for the 
practice. 
We shall start examining the theories by looking at one of the most prominent historians of 
the Ptolemaic period P.M. Fraser. In his monumental work Ptolemaic Alexandria 50, he addresses all 
aspects of life at that time. As the title suggests, the book mostly focusses on Alexandria, but Fraser 
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spends a lot of time in his investigation on the general situation of the country and is therefore very 
useful material for all studying the Ptolemaic period. He even generalizes to such extent that his 
theories can sometimes be applied to Hellenistic Empires as a whole. 
Fraser spends an entire chapter on the religious life in Ptolemaic Alexandria and dedicates a 
paragraph to the cults of the royal family and the dynastic cult.51 However, he only gives a relatively 
short explanation as to why Greeks would worship their living rulers as gods. According to Fraser, 
notable men (such as athletes and founders of city) could be given a cult upon their death and would 
then be worshipped by their fellow citizens as heroes. So the veneration of these men found their 
origin in the desire to express admiration and gratitude, not as a way to show subordination.52 Fraser 
believes that this tendency was susceptible for exploitation by individuals for personal and political 
gain. Therefore when Alexander demanded that the cities of the League of Corinth worship him as a 
god, he did this by appealing to an existing trend in Greek city life. That is, to venerate great people 
for their deeds. Alexander must also have been greatly influenced by his knowledge of the role of the 
king in oriental empires.53 The major issue with Fraser’s theory is, I believe, that some individuals 
were deified no matter what their personal achievements, or even in spite of these achievements (if 
they were, for instance, gruesome) or in fact lacking in all personal achievements.54 Let us now turn 
to the theories G. Hölbl who also believes that kingship finds its origin in the cult of heroes. 
The work of G. Hölbl is a true masterpiece and almost reads as a handbook on the history of 
the Ptolemaic Empire (which is in fact the title of the translated work).55 In this extensive work he 
covers most of nearly all fields of inquiry surrounding the Ptolemaic empire, this of course includes 
the divine status of the king in both the eyes of the Greeks and Egyptians. Hölbl believes that the two 
(Greek and Egyptian) cults mixed into an entirely new form of kingship. One which combined 
qualities from both traditions. From Greek model, it took the idea that the king had to adhere to 
certain model of behaviours that befitted a proper king.56 The performing of these acts would 
transform him into ‘a saviour, a liberator, protector and begetter and guarantor of fertility and 
affluence’.57 He thinks that for the Hellenistic basileus charisma and superhuman qualities were 
enough to bring him to the level of the gods, as opposed to the earlier pharaoh, who was merely the 
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mortal bearer of the divine office of Horus.58 All this then needs to be seen in the context of Greeks 
worshipping outstanding individuals as heroes upon their death. It is this practice that, according to 
Hölbl, caused an unclear distinction between god and man, and caused the cult to be transformed 
into the ruler cult honouring both the individual rulers as the entire Ptolemaic dynasty.59  
We can observe a strong resemblance to Frasers theory in this. Both emphasize the blurred 
line between men and gods and the influence of the native population within the empires. Hölbl 
therefore falls victim to the same objection as that for Fraser, that is; even non-outstanding 
individuals or even repulsive ones could receive divine honours in the Hellenistic period. Certainly 
not all basileus possessed the charisma and superhuman abilities needed ‘justify’ their position as 
gods, yet all were worshipped in the same manner. This leads me to believe that such considerations 
are perhaps an anachronistic condition opposed by the scholars themselves. This is a recurring 
opinion which we shall also observe below in the theories of another author, but first we shall turn to 
S.R.F. Price. 
 Both Fraser and Hölbl attest that the separation of humans in gods was not that sharp in 
Greek minds. S.R.F. Price is of the same opinion. In his book Rituals and Power he claims that this way 
of thinking in sharp distinctions is an exclusively Jewish and Christian occupation.60 Ancient Greeks, 
so he claims, recognized more categories than just the ends of the spectrum, divine or human. 
Unfortunately modern scholars have, in his opinion, not always outgrown this model of thinking, in 
which Greek (and Roman) religion is defined by its differences from Christian religion.61 
 Price thinks that the reason that Greeks started worshipping kings in general as gods is that 
in the polis society of Greeks there was no acceptable position available for the king.62 There were no 
laws for presenting this new power in the cities and Price therefore suggests that the only model 
available to them was the cult of the gods. The cults represented an absolute and external power 
outside of the city. It is interesting to see that Price thus disagrees with Fraser and other authors that 
claim that the origin of the ruler cult can be found in the cult of heroes. To corroborate this he 
unfortunately gives very few examples of events in antiquity where the separation between heroes 
and gods is made clear.63 
 The Roman ruler cult was somewhat similar in origin to the Hellenistic variant in that the 
phenomenon was also created at the end of the Republic to deal with the new power that the 
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emperor represented.64 However, there are several differences as well. These are not as pronounced 
in the Roman provinces, the old Hellenistic kingdoms that is. Here ruler cult continued as it had for 
centuries, only replacing the king with the new Roman emperor.65 Rome, and the Italian provinces, 
were another matter altogether. In the early empire, when the façade of the Republic still needed to 
be upheld, the emperor was only the first among equals and should behave as such. This meant that 
a cult to his person was certainly out of the question and any emperors who did attempt it were met 
with hostility and death.66 Therefore, it was only possible for the emperor to be deified after his 
death, if this apotheosis was granted by the senate, who would base their decision mostly on the 
moral character of the emperor.67 Price sees this as a way for the senate to remain in some form of 
power. By having the ultimate power over the deification of the emperor allowed them to elicit the 
desired behaviour from the emperor.68 
 Although a very fine theory, I find it wholly unconvincing that the senate held any sort of 
power in the deification of the emperor and certainly not that the apotheosis was based on the 
moral character of the emperor. A good example for this can be found in the deification of emperor 
Claudius, who was on the whole, not well loved by his contemporaries and by the following tradition. 
He is often portrayed as a suspicious fool and unnecessarily cruel.69 Yet he is immediately deified by 
his successor Nero upon death, despite possible reservations present in the senatorial elite such as 
Seneca, whose satirical piece the Apocolocyntosis vehemently argues against the deification. It claims 
that Claudius is wholly inappropriate for deification.70 I think that the myth, if you will, might just 
have been a way for the (senatorial) elite to deal with the inevitability of deifying the deceased 
emperor. It was simply tradition and, given the example of Claudius, long before the second century 
when the power of the senate truly gave way. In addition, Price makes no mention of the private 
worship the emperor received during lifetime and it is this that is relevant for our research, following 
the definition. 
Another set of views are expounded in a book, edited by P. Green, which brings together the 
lectures, responses and part of the discussion that were held at the Symposium on Hellenistic History 
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and Culture at the University of Texas in 1988.71 The book provides articles on a slew of subjects, 
however for the subject of this research, there is only one contribution (which includes a response 
and relevant discussion) that is applicable. This is the chapter on the Ptolemaic ideology of kingship 
by author A.E. Samuel.72 Amongst a general overview of what he believes is the role of kingship in the 
governing and administrating of Ptolemaic Egypt, namely not one where the king is all powerful and 
at the top of the administration, but one where the king is seen as separate from the government 
and as a protector of the people.73 Samuel argues that the divine nature of the Ptolemies was based 
mostly on the divine descent of the rulers. Evidence for this, he believes van be found in a poem 
Theocritus wrote as a eulogy for Ptolemy II. The poem is shaped like a traditional Homeric hymn and 
in here Ptolemy II Philadelphus kingship is likened several times to those of Zeus, Ptolemy I and 
Alexander the Great, all gods and his predecessors.74 Samuel believes that seeing as there is prove 
for Philadelphus as a god (mostly in oaths), this association with these gods and kings was enough to 
make the divinity of the Ptolemaic rulers acceptable.75 Although he does express his doubt on 
whether the Greeks in Egypt would exclusively call upon the divine rulers in oaths and would turn to 
the ‘real’ gods, such as Sarapis or Isis, for other matters.76 
 His position is attacked by D. Delia who responds in the second part of the chapter to the 
theory Samuel proposes. Delia points to the fact that there is ample evidence that Greek intellectuals 
fundamentally disagree with the status of living individuals (even kings) as gods. However, in light of 
the evidence she must admit that there certainly was a Greek cult which venerated the Ptolemaic 
dynasty.77 The reason for this can be found in dual manifestations of the cult that merge into one. 
One part is the hero cult belonging to Alexander the Great and the second part was simply reverence 
created by royal power, so it was not the king who was divine, but the office of kingship which he 
holds.78 In the discussion later on Delia adds that she would find it hard to believe that both Greeks 
and Egyptian worshipped Ptolemy VIII as a god for he was caught up in civil war with his family, so it 
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therefore must have been the office of kingship they worshipped, for Ptolemy VIII would not have 
many other qualities to worship.79 Delia adds that this entire thing must be seen not through a 
Judeo-Christian point of view, but a Greek point of view in which divinity was not absolute. Divinity 
was an abstract used to signify several levels of power.80 
Unfortunately by combining the importance of letting go of the Judeo-Christian point of view 
with the theory about the divinity of the office of kingship, she, in my view, undermines her own 
argument. Greek mythology is in fact riddled with fallible gods or even gods who struggle for the 
maintenance of their throne. To name but one example Kronos was still worshipped as a god after he 
lost his throne to his son Zeus. Yet the Greeks had absolutely no doubt about their divinity and no 
issue in worshipping them. So Delia might in fact be influenced by the same Judeo-Cristian view that 
she warned us about. The issues surrounding the kingship did not have any influence on the status of 
the king as a god. It therefore seems unlikely to me, and in fact unnecessary, to suppose that there 
was a division between veneration of the office of kingship and that of the king himself.81 Although it 
is certainly true that intellectuals, both Greek and Roman, believed that the king should meet certain 
requirements before he begot his divinity, these were mostly confined to other elements. We saw 
this above in Price’s argument about the Roman emperor, however, the fact that some kings or 
emperors were deified no matter how great the resistance from the elite is characteristic of the fact 
that individual characteristics of the king did not matter much. 
As we have seen most arguments in this category of opinions centre around the fact that 
divinity is not as absolute as we, in our modern perception, often perceive it to be, is a recurrent 
theme for several scholars. It is, after all, a very easy way to explain the phenomenon by simply 
chalking it up to a different way of thinking, too far removed from us both temporal and culturally to 
understand. It seems to us as if there might be a contradiction in Greeks and natives worshipping 
their rulers, when they have not done so before, but it was clearly overcome in light of the evidence. 
Yet not all scholars believe the explanation for the phenomenon to be so frank. There are authors 
that believe the difficulties mostly intellectuals experienced for the phenomena was due to a feeling 
that there was a definite difference between men and gods. The worshipping of a mortal individual 
as a god, they point out, would be utterly different than anything they had practiced before and was 
generally undesirable. The following group of authors take this position as their starting point and 
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their theories mostly centre on how this fundamental difference between men and gods was 
overcome.  
Section 1.2.2: Or perhaps not 
As mentioned, the next group of authors are scholars who claim that the transition to worshipping 
living rulers as gods was a fundamental change indeed. This group employs more primary material in 
their arguments than the authors who were mentioned above. This can be expected, for if it were 
self-evident that the transition could be made then ancient Greeks might not have bothered to write 
about the start of worshipping living rulers as gods or objection to the fact at all. Yet there are a good 
deal of sources about this very fact and scholars make good use of them. Let us continue to the 
authors and their theories. 
 The first author to represent this different take on things is C. Habicht. Although his theories 
in his book Gottmenschentum und Griechische Städte 82 have been labelled as outdated by several 
authors83, this is unsurprising when one considers that Habicht’s book is the oldest book in the 
debate. It is therefore to be expected that he received the most critique of any of the authors. 
However, despite this fact he is still oft quoted in modern works and is certainly an excellent starting 
point of this group of authors. 
 Habicht focusses on the political aspect of the ruler cult in the Greek world, for he believes 
that the religious side of the cult is (as of yet) inaccessible.84 From the start it becomes clear that his 
point of departure differs greatly from the earlier authors who were, at the very least, cautioned by 
the idea of inaccessibility yet continued nonetheless. Habicht therefore believes that the ruler cult 
was born from the need of the Greek to honour these great men who possessed the same power as 
the gods over their lives.85 The kings fulfilled the same role as that of the old city-gods, they were the 
protectors of the Greeks. The explanation for why some Greek intellectuals (who were also mostly 
politicians) objected to the worship of these men can then also be found in the political sphere. 
Habicht’s view of the ruler cult claims that these intellectuals were not opposing the worship of kings 
out of religious persuasions, but that the worship of these rulers was opposed out of political 
opinions and aversions.86 The ruler cult in his eyes was the compromise of between the cultic 
honouring of the dead and the secular honouring of the living, which were now both inadequate.87 
                                                          
82
 C. Habicht, Gottmenschentum und Griechische Städte (München 1956). 
83
 Several examples are: M. Bergmann, Die Strahlen der Herrscher, Theomorphes Herrschersbild und politische 
Symbolik im Hellenismus und der römischen Kaiserzeit (Mainz 1998), 17. Fraser, Volume 3, 361-362. Badian, 
‘Deification’, 29-31. 
84
 O. Murray, ‘Christian Habicht: Gottmenschentum und griechische Städte. Zweite Auflage. Review’, The 
Classical Review 22.3 (1972), 427, 427. And P.M. Fraser, ‘Christian Habicht: Gottmenschentum und griechische 
Städte. Review’, The Classical Review 8.2 (1958), 153-156, 153. 
85
 Habicht, Gottmenschentum, 162, 170, 210, 232. Bergmann, Strahlen der Herrscher, 17. 
86
 Habicht, Gottmenschentum, 213-221. 
87
 Ibidem, 212-213. 
21 
 
 Although his attestation that we cannot access the religious experience of the ancients is 
laudable, it is after all what this research is ultimately about, Habicht takes it too far. By arguing, for 
instance, that the opposition of Greek intellectuals was solely based on their political persuasions, he 
basically denies the existence of the religious sphere in the matter. In such a fundamental matter as 
the opposition to the idea, religious persuasions cannot be ignored, how troublesome their form 
might be. Add to this the fact that he focusses exclusively on the Hellenistic period and on the 
worship in Greek poleis and it becomes evident that his theories and research are too limited for the 
scope of this research.  
A. Chaniotis also believes that there is a difference between the Hellenistic kings and the 
gods. He therefore claims that the Hellenistic rulers were not truly gods, but were on the same level 
as the gods, courtesy of their ability to offer the same protection.88 Chaniotis uses a wealth of 
primary material to make his point and the amount of work is incredible. His main thesis is that the 
Hellenistic rulers were able to provide the same amount of protection the gods were thought to 
provide, therefore making them eligible to ‘honours equal to those bestowed upon the gods’, which 
is a Greek phrase that is often used.89 Chaniotis also searches for the reasons for the cities to install 
the cults they did and for the ruler to accept them. The cities hoped to reaffirm their special bond 
with the ruler and to invite his favour upon the city. The principle being that if the ruler was 
worshipped as a god, he should behave as such and provide protection and be benevolent towards 
them.90 The rulers certainly also benefited from the arrangement, as it gave them the ideological 
support for their power. It could also function as a unifying element for the Greek and native 
population within the Hellenistic kingdoms.91 The success of the ruler cult was due to its ability to be 
a medium for communication between ruler and people. In fact, it was so successful that the Romans 
continued the practice as part of the ideology of the Principate.92 
It is very difficult to refute Chaniotis’ work, his use of primary material is quite convincing, as 
is the manner in which it supports his argument. The only objection that remains is that of S. Pfeiffer, 
who follows M. Clauss in saying that it is very likely that, given the fact that ancients did call some of 
their rulers gods and provided them with cults, they could be considered gods.93 The fact that kings 
and emperors received the same worship and were addressed in the same way as the gods, makes 
them gods. This is obviously not quite satisfying as it does not take into account all the material that 
Chaniotis uses in which the rulers were addressed as men who had acquired the same worship as the 
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gods, but were nonetheless men. The problem then is one of definition in antiquity, who or what 
constituted a god was problematic for some. Yet these were mostly intellectuals who felt this, 
whereas there is ample evidence of the general populace worshipping the living rulers. Chaniotis’ 
material will however, certainly need to be taken into account in chapter 3 when we examine our 
case studies. 
In the previous section all theories mentioned have unfortunately been inadequate in some 
manner. Some by claiming that the phenomenon shows continuity and was therefore fairly easily 
explained as ancient men simply experienced divinity in a different manner than we do now. The 
‘problem’ we perceive is therefore of our own creation. There was certainly a manner of continuity 
to be found as there are precedents for worshipping living men before the Hellenistic period. 
However, this is on such a small scale that there is a definite change, which is what the second group 
advocate. I also believe there is no reason to question the fact that ancients experienced divinity in a 
different manner then us, as was shortly alluded to above. As M. Clauss formulates it: 
 
“Weshalb soll in einer Zeit, in der Göttliches in allem und jedem vorstellbar war, in der jeder 
Mensch in einem Mysterienkult selbst zur Gottheid warden konnte, der Kaiser, der kein 
beliebiger Mensch war, nicht als Gottheid gesehen worden sein?” 94 
 
When intellectuals protested against the fact that the kings had no place amongst the gods, 
they did exactly that. They were not protesting against a watered down position of a god that the 
ruler could or should possess, but literally against the position of the king or emperor amongst the 
gods. 
On the other hand are those that hold that it was certainly a fundamental switch in thinking 
and they give different reasons for doing so. It is clearly very difficult to say where the origin or the 
cause of flourishing lay when looking at the ruler cults. In fact current theories might raise more 
questions than they answer. So perhaps it is not as much about how new it is, but why it flourishes so 
suddenly. Why does the phenomenon go from a sporadic custom to the nationwide tradition we see 
in the Hellenistic period? And what mechanics could lie at the foundation of this? Let us now 
examine cognitive science in more detail and see if and what these theories could provide as a useful 
basis from which to examine the Hellenistic and Roman ruler cult.  
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Chapter 2: A new method 
Current theories are insufficient to explain the occurrence and the persistence of the ruler cult in 
both Roman and Hellenistic times. A new way of looking at the phenomenon could provide us with 
fresh ideas and perhaps rule out some of the current theories. The Cognitive Science of Religion (CSR) 
could very well supply us with this new avenue of thinking. As mentioned, it is a new inter-
disciplinary approach trying to explain religions and their expressions throughout the world and 
throughout time. Given the fact that our brain is wired in a certain way, regardless of the cultural 
influences, and that this has not changed in any significant manner in the last thousands of years, 
CSR tries to explain religion on the basis of neuroscience. 
 However, there are issues with the use of CSR and many questions that arise before we can 
even consider using it. Issues include the fact that there is debate within the community of Cognitive 
scientist, who cannot reach a consensus on the finer points of their so-called ‘Standard Model’. Some 
of these will feature below, however one example of this debate is A.C.T. Smith who agrees with the 
general points of the model, yet believes that it overstates the ‘naturalness’ of religious belief.95 Yet, 
there must be a standard model, given the results of empirical experiments and this must then be 
adhered to by all, it is this that we can use to assess whether CSR has any value for the study of 
Ancient History and more specifically for the study of the Roman and Hellenistic ruler cult. However, 
we do need to assess the general validity and the basis of the claims made by the Standard Model. 
CSR is in no way fixed to its current form and it is not my intention to try and improve the model in 
any way, as I most assuredly do not have the academic background to do so. What I hope to do in the 
following sections is, as stated above, appraise if the current model is useful for Ancient History.96 
There are also several other questions that need answering, for instance, what is the influence of 
culture on religious phenomena? In other words, where does the model stop working and socio-
cultural research methods come into play? What is the influence of evolution on our cognitive 
structure? And is religious thinking something that is special or does anyone possess the capability 
for religious thought? 
The Cognitive Science of Religion (CSR) is a very new strand of research, only around 25 years 
old, but it has quickly gained territory due to its applicability and promise.97 The strong version of CSR 
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holds that religion is acquired and spread because it finds support in our cognitive mechanisms. How 
exactly this is done is one of the best developed and empirically supported research in CSR and this is 
expounded in seven points in the Standard Model. 
 This so-called Standard Model is a seven point construct which was first described by Boyer, 
already referred to in the introduction as one of the most influential names in CSR.98 The model is 
believed to exemplify the major areas of consensus amongst those who occupy themselves with the 
cognitive study of religion. The key-points of the model are those that are the best developed and 
most empirically supported and it focusses on one of the (or perhaps THE) most important factors in 
CSR, that is, the belief in supernatural agents.99 This belief in supernatural agents is what demarcates, 
what we think of as religious thought, from other thought processes. This is not to say that the 
current model is definitive in form. Although the broad outline will most likely remain, details will be 
added or changed depending on ongoing empirical research. Let us examine this Standard Model and 
the evidence for it, as it will also serve as a more specific introduction to CSR. 
 The first point of the model is the fact that religious concepts are incredibly successful and 
inferentially rich by-products of normal brain functions.100 This statement needs clarification of 
course. It is based on the fact that there is no specific area in the brain that processes religious 
thoughts. Our brain processes information in a modular manner.101 That is rather than being one big 
problem-solving machine or encyclopaedia, our brain has specific areas dedicated to all manner of 
very specialized systems that are turned on or off when we behold different kinds of objects and this 
can be scientifically verified.102 To illustrate this Boyer gives the following example: 
 
“When people are presented with a novel artefact-like and animal-like pictures, their brains 
do show different activation. In the case of artefacts, there seems to be enough activity in 
the pre-motor cortex (involved in planning movements) to suggest that the system is trying 
to figure out (forgive the anthropomorphic tone: the system is of course not aware of what it 
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is doing) some way of handling this new object. But this only applies if the object is tool-like.” 
103 
 
But why would the brain not be aware of what it is doing? Because all of these processes happen in 
a, for us, inaccessible part of the brain. It is intuitive knowledge that does not allow or require 
conscious examination of the thought process.104 Certain sets of intuitive knowledge are already 
present in early childhood.105 For instance, children from a very early age ‘know’ that one physical 
object cannot pass through another (say a ball cannot pass through a wall).106 However, why or how 
they know this is beyond them. It simply makes sense to them and that is intuitive knowledge. This 
knowledge has many variations, but together they form the basis from which we infer information 
given the impulses that we receive from the world.107 The fact that this happens in sections and is 
unconscious due to evolutionary triggers which ensured our survival as a species.108 If our brain only 
possessed general purpose intelligence (like the encyclopaedia) and/or had to think about every little 
decision, it would be far too slow. So-called instincts save you if, in pre-historic times, you hear 
rustling behind you in the bushes and it turns out to be a bear or such. If you have to consciously 
think about what it could be and then what your decision should be based on that, you will already 
have been eaten.109 This modular nature of our brains also has consequences for religious thinking. 
Religious concepts are those that the brain finds most ‘exciting’. That is, these kinds of thought 
trigger several parts of our brain, they are therefore more memorable and fit more easily into our 
expectation.110 Exactly how this happens is defined in the other six points of the Standard Model. 
 The second point provides one of the categories which our brains react strongly to, that is 
inferences about the world that are minimally counter-intuitive. To explain this we must first 
examine what counter-intuitiveness means and how this can be recognized. To do this we must 
examine certain templates of intuitive knowledge that our brains have formed. Following that, we 
must examine the connection of this intuitive knowledge with the supernatural. 
 Our modular brain forms certain unconscious theories about the world and this intuitive 
knowledge ensures that we can react to impulses in our world in a speedy manner. In short, it helps 
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us to function on a very basic level. By running these theories in an unconscious manner, the 
conscious part of our brain can occupy itself with more difficult thoughts.111 Counter-intuitive 
concepts are those that violate these theories in a certain way, which makes them stand out. Gods, 
spirits and werewolves are counterintuitive agents, they violate our theories about what this 
category usually entails in some way. For instance, agents normally have a body, they are physical, 
yet the Christian, Jewish and Muslim god does not.112 This makes him counter-intuitive. However, 
this does not mean that humans will turn any counter-intuitive concept into something supernatural. 
As Boyer puts it there is no ‘intellectual free-for-all where all conceptual combinations are equally 
possible’.113 They must be minimally counter-intuitive to be both believable and transferable. Too 
many counter-intuitive violation and the concept quickly becomes unbelievable and therefore not 
very likely to be picked up by many people and across cultures, as the theories that govern these 
expectations are universally human.114 For example: 
 
“Compare an invisible buffalo to an invisible buffalo that is immortal, made of steel, 
experiences time backwards, fails to exist on Saturdays, gains nourishment from ideas, and 
gives birth to kittens.” 115 
 
The first case is obviously more credible than the second. The first concept only holds one counter-
intuitive aspect, that is: the buffalo is invisible, which is not something we unconsciously or 
consciously expect from a buffalo. The second however, can hardly be considered to be a buffalo at 
all, but is merely an enumeration of attributes rather than a coherent concept.116 Minimally counter-
intuitive concepts are those that violate just enough unconscious expectation to make them 
interesting for our brain, this will also make them strong candidates for being successfully spread 
amongst people.117 In fact, having minimally counter-intuitive concepts around has been proven to 
make them far more memorable because they stand out against the background of the ordinary 
concepts that one possesses.118 
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 However, where the boundary lies between minimally counter-intuitive and simply counter-
intuitive is not exactly clear and determining this is no easy task, although crucial.119 J.L. Barrett has 
recently developed a way to code and quantify counter-intuitiveness in objects (broadly 
construed).120 Meaning he excludes events, substances and abstractions, as there is little reason to 
believe that these things activate pan-human cognition in a similar manner to objects and more 
evidence would be needed to justify doing this. Instead he focusses on ontological categories of 
concepts such as; ‘persons’, ‘artefacts’, ‘tools’, ‘plants’, ‘animals’ and ‘living things’.121 The basic 
principle underlying the coding is, what Barrett calls the Simplicity Rule. This states that ‘when coding 
concepts, assume the simplest (i.e., least counterintuitive) conceptual representation that captures 
the object’s properties’.122 With these considerations in mind he identifies six steps for coding 
counter-intuitiveness.123 However, this theory is still in his infancy as he himself acknowledges and 
there are several issues that make the application of his theory troublesome and that goes beyond a 
lack of empirical evidence. 
 The first problem that I personally identify lies with the Simplicity Rule itself. If there are two 
or more breaches in the counter-intuitive concept that you are examining, then, according to Barrett, 
it will get re-represented in the theory in a simpler (less counter-intuitive) manner.124 But this just 
means that you can make anything minimally counter-intuitive as long as you are creative enough 
with your categories. If you just keep puzzling until you find a minimally counter-intuitive way to 
represent your concept then it will have moved away from the theory entirely. You will remember, 
intuitive knowledge is that which you come to in an instinctive and unconscious manner, if you come 
up with entirely far-fetched constructions in order to make your concept minimally counter-intuitive 
it will be unnatural and artificial. To illustrate, Barrett believes that god in the Abrahamic tradition 
would have a counter-intuitiveness ‘score’ of 10 or more, if represented as a Person with all aspects 
and powers god is said to possess (bodiless, omnipresent, omnipotent, eternal, etc.). However, if we 
refashion god’s basic category into a Mind, rather than a person, he would only score on one or two 
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in the counter-intuitive quantification.125 This seems a troublesome thing to me, given that the 
Abrahamic god is usually represented as anthropomorphic, a very special kind of person. Seeing 
supernatural concepts in anthropomorphic manner is a very natural thing to do and is very 
widespread throughout cultures all over the world.126 This anthropomorphism is not only something 
that concerns the physical attributes of the concept (although supernatural beings can certainly be 
person-like in appearance), but it is mostly psychological. Supernatural agents possess minds and 
therefore exhibit signs of agency. These aspects however, are not necessarily felt to be human, as it 
can also be present in animals and anything that appears to be moving of its own accord in 
pursuance of a goal.127 So although Barrett’s thinking might not be impossible it seems rather 
implausible in my opinion. 
 However this is not the only problem that arises, there are for instance many counter-
intuitive concepts in our modern world that do not make it into the supernatural realm, such as 
Santa Claus or Mickey Mouse.128 Barrett explains this in another article from the same year, there are 
obviously more criteria that have to be met. Barrett suggests that to become a supernatural concept 
a minimally counter-intuitive concept must also be an intentional agent, possess strategic 
information, act in the real world in a detectable way and motivate behaviours that reinforce 
belief.129 Barrett plots this information in a table to illustrate: 
Table 1 Requisites for Supernatural Agents 130 
 Counter-
intuitive 
Intentional 
agent 
Possessing 
strategic 
information 
Acts in the 
real world 
Motivates 
reinforcing 
behaviours 
Santa Claus Inconsistent Yes Marginal Yes Marginal 
Mickey Mouse Yes Yes No No No 
Tooth Fairy Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
George Bush No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
The point is that a counter-intuitive concept needs to have more aspects to become an acceptable 
supernatural one for people. While this is most likely true it also raises some questions, for instance 
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why do people not believe in all supernatural concepts? Why would you believe in the Abrahamic 
god, but not in Zeus?131 There are also distant high gods that do not interact with the world or 
motivate reinforcing behaviours, such as in several African religions.132 These are both after all gods, 
at least upon a time, in known religions yet according to Barrett they would not qualify. According to 
Gervais and Henrich, this is because Barrett only takes into account the content of the concepts, but 
excludes their context. 
 
“Content biases may explain why both religious beliefs and folk tales involve similar content, 
but context biases may be required to determine why people believe the former rather than 
the latter, or to determine which candidate god concepts are believed to exist in a given 
cultural context.” 133 
 
 In sum, although there is clear evidence that religious concepts are minimally counter-
intuitive and that this contributes to their memorability and successful transmission, it is not clear 
how this counter-intuitivism works exactly. There is no clear way yet to distinguish between 
minimally counter-intuitive concepts and counter-intuitive ones. Additionally it has become all the 
more clearer that while CSR can provide a basis for religious concepts, it cannot account for their 
specific expression in different cultural contexts. It can suggest the templates or forms religion can 
take, but why and how they become widespread and successful remains a matter of cultural 
circumstances. However, to anticipate on things to come, an excellent example of a minimally 
counter-intuitive concept is the Hellenistic and Roman rulers who were seen as gods/supernatural 
agents. They clearly violate the minds standard theories for humans. 
 In all this it remains important to remember that the recognition of something as a 
supernatural concept all happens in the unconscious part of our brain, as the first point of the model 
indicated. There is no ontological category for supernatural concepts, these piggy-back on the normal 
categories that intuitively exist in our brains. This does not mean that we never consciously interact 
with these concepts. In every interaction, be that with another human or a supernatural concept, 
there is always a conscious part of our brain at work against an unconscious backdrop. When 
conversing with someone the conscious part of your brain is occupied with figuring out what the 
sounds coming out of the other persons mouth mean and how it should be responded to. However, 
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at the same time, the unconscious part of our brain is busy with things like body language, which can 
influence the meaning of the sounds. But there is also a part of our brain that functions on a ‘deeper’ 
level.134 That is, all information which has to do with ontological categories and expectations based 
on that. If we are talking with the person behind the cash register in the local supermarket, we are 
not consciously busy with the fact that this person is human and therefore has two arms. What does 
happen consciously is that if we see that both hands are visibly occupied, we should hold on to the 
money for the groceries until at least one is empty. We rarely function purely on our 
unconsciousness, the exception perhaps being the running-from-a-bear reflex given above. In every 
other interaction there is always an interplay between the conscious and unconscious part of our 
brain. 
 The third point of the Standard Model dictates that Agency Detection leads to suppositions 
about the presence of supernatural agents.135 This point is very central to the model, although there 
is little empirical research supporting it as of yet.136 Agency detection, as you will remember from 
above, is an evolutionary trait that ascribes agency to events around us and helps us for instance, to 
instinctively react to a sound behind us without having to deliberate about the action to take. 
However, our agency detection is not always right, in fact we have a tendency to jump to conclusions 
about the presence of agencies.137 Boyer sees this as an important evolutionary trait that is a 
remnant from our time as predator or prey, where in either situation it is/was advantageous to over-
detect rather than under-detect.138 This over-detection is called ‘Hypersensitive agent detection 
device’ (HADD) and it has been suggested that the individual differences in the activation level of 
HADD is connected to why certain people are prone to atheism rather than religious believe.139 All 
this means that people who have an easily triggered HADD are likely to naturally infer the presence 
of supernatural agents to ascribe responsibility of the unexplainable.140 However, crucially we do not 
only infer their presence, but we also mentality, as was alluded to above in Barrett’s theory. 
According to Boyer and Barrett there are five cues which lead to inference of agency, of which the 
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final two refer to mentality.141 Number four is crucial: ‘the end-result of an action being connected to 
perceived movement through the link of the intention of the moving organism (intention-
ascription)’.142 As Smith puts: 
 
“… we possess minds designed for registering agency in uncertain circumstances, which leads 
to presumptions that supernatural agents take an active role in our lives.” 143 
 
Also recall Barrett’s criteria for supernatural agents from the point above. Although this all seems 
very convincing at first, it must be noted that this does not explain everything. After all we must not 
only perceive an agent, because religious beliefs are widespread and persistent even if we lack a cue 
to trigger HADD at that time.144 Most of the time if we interpret a noise of some sort as indicating the 
presence of an agent, we quickly verify that there either is one and of what kind this is or that there 
is none and then move on. If we could not discard such false positives quickly we would most likely 
spend our lives recoiled in fear.145 Yet, supernatural agents are perceived as stable, in fact, they must 
be if an religion is to spring from it. 
 To conclude, it is most likely that our HADD triggers our first impression of supernatural 
agents. However, these are set apart from other activations of the system, because these persist 
even when we have verified that there was no agent truly present. This persistence might be 
explained due to cultural influences such as imitation of prestigious individuals, the rest of the 
Standard Model will account for this further. For our purposes, it is important to recognize that the 
agent detection might be of secondary importance as the deified ruler is already an identifiable 
agent. What is important is that certain unexplainable happenings must be recognized as his 
superhuman/supernatural actions, even when he is not physically present. 
 The next point of the Standard Model, the fourth, expands on the previous one and is rather 
straightforward given the previous. That is, given that supernatural agents possess agency, we make 
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assumptions as to their intentions for us.146 According to Boyer, they are connected with moral 
institutions as they are interested in decision making. Therefore, ‘religious morality is parasitic upon 
evolved moral institutions that are there, religion or not’.147 You will recall that I have my 
reservations about this point, as there is no true evidence to support, for instance that there ever 
was a world without religion that had functioning moral institutions.148 Pyysiäinen, amongst others, 
would argue for the fact that the rise of ‘big gods’, those with omniscient scope and punitive abilities, 
is a phenomenon that is strongly connected to the rise of large complex societies.149 Although I 
would think that there were also experiences of supernatural agents with punitive powers before the 
rise of complex civilization. Agents, such as ancestor spirits, would certainly be perceived as having a 
vested interest in hunter-gatherer societies, it is only logical that they would also have some form of 
punitive power, otherwise they would not meet the requirements of CSR as supernatural agents, as 
shown in Table 1. We humans often ascribe intentionality to other agents (whether those are other 
humans, animals or sometimes even the temperamental computer). This helps us to understand the 
reasoning behind certain decisions and allows us to anticipate certain behaviours in others.150 
Supernatural agents partly trigger the same response as any other agent would from our social 
mind.151 However there is a crucial difference, which has everything to do with Boyer’s concept of 
strategic information. Boyer argues that, at any given time when interacting with another individual, 
we receive two types of information. For instance, when on a dinner date with someone, there is a 
part of the brain that is trying to interpret everything the other is saying and the meaning of this (this 
can be very complicated because of innuendo’s and other types of hints). All this is possible because 
our inference systems for social interactions is busy at work.152 This is the conscious part of our brain, 
the unconscious part of our brain is busy with its environment, that is staying seated during the 
conversation and eating the food instead of the cutlery.153 As mentioned above, this then creates an 
interesting an interesting circle of feedback between these two parts. Boyer distinguishes between 
the socially neutral information and the specific information that activates the social inference 
systems in our mind. The latter is what he calls strategic information: 
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“Strategic information is the subset of all the information currently available (to a particular 
agent, about a particular situation) which activates the mental systems that regulate social 
interaction.” 154 
 
What is strategic information is dictated by the situation, that is what that specific person hopes to 
achieve or get out of the interaction.155 We also base our own action on how much strategic 
information we perceive our interlocutor to have and a fundamental principle in our intuitive 
knowledge-system is, that the access to this information is imperfect. In our interactions therefore 
we presumes that other people’s access to strategic information is imperfect (as is our own access to 
the information of others).156 
 Fundamentally we interact with supernatural agents in much the same way as we do with 
other humans, which is why interaction with them is often felt as very natural.157 As you will recall, 
supernatural agents have minds and perceive things much the same way as humans do and so we 
speculate as to what their intentions are. The major difference however, is that we perceive 
supernatural agents as having full access to strategic information, which is why they often possess 
some form of punitive powers.158 This ability is obviously counter-intuitive as we discussed in the 
second point above and it leads to the easier remembrance and, in this case more importantly, to 
easy transmission throughout a society.159 
 This brings us to the fifth point of the Standard Model, that is religious rituals are constrained 
by agency assumptions.160 A difficult point to grasp, but the central idea is that the inferred presence 
of supernatural agents during the execution of a ritual causes a number of intuitions about other 
elements in the ritual. A religious ritual is part of social interaction and is cognitively represented as 
an action as any other, it just so happens that the agent that is being motivated to act is supernatural 
in nature.161 However, there is an important difference, because the goal of the religious ritual is to 
bring about a natural consequence by non-natural means.162 Experimental evidence indicates that 
three expectations follow from seeing the ritual as social actions, these would explain the similarities 
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in ritual actions throughout the world as they are also based in general cognitive patterns. The first 
expectation is that anyone will be able to deduce whether a certain action will elicit a certain 
response, that includes whether a ritual is likely to be efficacious.163 The second expectation is that 
any person will also appreciate the central importance of a supernatural agent if a ritual provides a 
non-natural consequence.164 Finally, given that certain social actions require certain appropriate 
agents to procure the necessary result, so too does a ritual. Having the right person execute the 
ritual is felt to be vitally important, this is also connected with the formulaic nature of rituals.165 To 
illustrate the concept, please consider this example:  
 
“A woman striking a sick man with a staff does not cure him unless the woman, the staff, the 
man, or some combination of them has some special connection to an agent (or agents) with 
special qualities. Otherwise, instead of recovery you only get bruises.” 166 
 
The expected outcome of the ritual is certainly counter-intuitive, a touch of a staff is not normally 
thought to cure anyone. There is no logical connection between the action and it’s consequence. So 
if the cure does come to pass, then the influence of a supernatural agent is inferred. This presence is 
felt to be more important than anything else in the ritual. The staff could very well be substituted 
with a leek and the woman with a dog, if the outcome is the same then the supernatural agent will 
just have chosen them as a conduit. However, should the ritual fail in this new situation, the cause of 
this will most likely be found with the agent performing the ritual (the dog), then with the action.167 It 
is important to note for the Standard Model, that the composition and practice of rituals is very 
important in the experience and the propagation of religious ideas.168 
 This brings us to the next point in the model, which also focusses on why religion is so 
widespread. Religious ideas and concepts are connected to theories about death and other 
existential implications that find their origin in non-religious sources.169 Boyer claims that a great deal 
of religious elaboration centres on souls and spirits of dead people.170 That is, exposure to mortality 
triggers a whole slew of non-obvious cognitive effects (a punishing attitude towards social deviance, 
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for instance).171 However, most interestingly, experiments show that ‘emotional stress associated 
with death-related scenes seems a stronger natural motivator for religiosity than mere exposure to 
emotionally non-stressful religious scenes, such as praying’.172 On the other hand, people are not 
only occupied with mortality, but most death rituals focus on what to should be done with corpses. 
According to Boyer this is caused by the fact that: 
 
“Dead people create a discrepancy between the output of different mental systems. On the 
one hand, systems that regulate our intuitions about animacy have little difficulty 
understanding that a dead body is a non-intentional, inanimate subject. On the other hand, 
social-intelligence systems do not ‘shut off’ with death; indeed most people still have 
thoughts and feelings about the recently dead.” 173 
 
This might also explain why dead people so often feature as supernatural agents. Although this is an 
interesting point of the Standard Model and likely central to many enquiries, it is not all that relevant 
for us. The Hellenistic and Roman deified rulers are alive, in fact, that is the whole point. Otherwise 
we would ‘simply’ see another manifestation of death cults, but the strange thing about this 
phenomenon is precisely that a living agent is the subject of supernatural worship. Furthermore, to 
my knowledge, the deified ruler is only connected to his own death cult and that of his predecessors 
in Hellenistic and Roman culture. This expression of this part of the cult for the ruler is not part of this 
research as it falls outside of our definition for ruler cult. Powers and influence in the afterlife was 
mostly the domain of other gods. 
 The last and seventh point of the Standard Model, on the other hand, is incredibly relevant 
for our research. It states that religious concepts are ideally suited for coalitional affiliation, that is 
because they provide a clear set of markers that separate one social group from another and the 
whole group had a shared commitment to costly activities.174 Although this is the final point of the 
Standard Model, one should not be fooled into thinking it is unimportant or more of an afterthought. 
In fact, it is perhaps the most practical point in the entire model. If you will remember, one of the 
common explanations for the origin of religions, was its role in society (both in holding it together 
and creating order). Many scholars outside of the CSR-community still hold that this is its primary aim 
and therefore it must be connected to its origin.175 Although this is certainly a bridge too far, as 
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stated above, religion undoubtedly plays a crucial role in society, but how should we imagine this 
influence? 
 The answer to this again stems from the fact that we must view interaction with supernatural 
agents as social-interaction. Human society functions on cooperation and for that we need trust, in 
that for it to function we cannot feel cheated out of more resources then we receive in return.176 In 
small groups this reciprocity does not need to go beyond relatives, a mother sacrificing herself for 
her child is detrimental to her own health and survival, but beneficial in the long run for it will allow 
for her genes to be passed on to future generations through the child.177 This kind of altruism makes 
sense from an evolutionary point of view, but it cannot be the basis for large-scale societies as the 
group would fall apart in short order. For this ‘indirect-reciprocity’ is needed, as biologist R. 
Alexander calls it.178 This means that we must be willing to help strangers, without necessarily 
expecting something in return directly from them, as you may never meet again.179 This is where 
trust comes in, we must trust the persons in our society to do the same for us as we do for them, 
even if we do not know them and may never see them again.180 Or alternatively we must trust in our 
ability to locate ‘cheaters’ in the system, however this detection takes a lot of energy. This is where 
the second part of Alexander’s indirect-reciprocity comes into play: 
 
“Consider a population whose individuals have the option to cooperate or not. Suppose 
individual X randomly meets individual Y. If Y has a reputation for cooperation and if X 
cooperates with Y, then X’s reputation likely increases. If X does not cooperate with Y, then 
X’s reputation likely decreases.” 181 
 
Although this situation raises quite a few questions, for instance how does X even know that Y is 
known for helping people? It raises an interesting point, that is: reputation. There is quite a bit of 
proof for the fact that those with a cooperative reputation get rewarded for this in future social 
interaction, both within as outside of one’s group.182 However, this does not solve the cheater-
problem, for this a system needs to be in place to rule out the possibility of cheating.183 According to 
Pyysiäinen there is an arms race going on between the co-operators and the cheaters, to develop a 
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system of hard-to-fake and costly signals of commitment and ways to beat this.184 This is precisely 
the role that religion plays, according to the Standard Model. Showing your religious commitment 
signals that you are part of the cooperating group and provides you with status that matches the 
amount of sacrifice you make.185 Religion also has the ‘added bonus’, so to say, that there is a 
policing force that sees all and patrols for the desired moral behaviour.186 This point will certainly 
prove vital, in the examination of the Hellenistic and Roman rulers cults, below. 
 That concludes our overview of the Standard Model for CSR, what most cognitive scientists 
acknowledge as the unconscious basis and continuation of religion in human society. The belief in 
supernatural agents is something natural that follows from the hardware of our brain (although it is 
by no means inevitable). The first half of the model focuses on the source of this thinking, whereas 
the last points focus more on the practical consequences of these in human society. The first four 
points of the model explain that basis for religious thought, that the brain is primed for registering 
religious concepts. The last three points are the social influences which ultimately ensure that a 
certain religious concept is successful and widespread. For our inquiry into the origin and flourishing 
of the Hellenistic and Roman ruler cults not all points will prove equally valuable. However, this 
overview signals the boundaries of possible theories about the subject.  
 In this chapter we set out to examine Cognitive science, and more specifically the Cognitive 
science of Religion (CSR), in more detail. The Standard Model generally adhered to by most scholars 
provides the best way to do this. The seven points of the Standard Model form the basis for an 
explanation of religion, both its origin and its flourishing. While the finer points of the model are not 
agreed upon by scholars in cognitive science and not all points are equally pertinent to our current 
research, it is backed by a generous amount of empirical evidence. Furthermore there are points in 
the general model which are difficult to put into practice, most prominently the second point of the 
model, which concerns the minimally counter-intuitiveness of possible supernatural concepts. The 
point is crucial to the model, but there is as of yet no successful way to determine and quantify 
counter-intuitiveness. It should therefore be evident that the model is in no way in its final form. 
There are elements which need rounded out and elaborated with more empirical evidence and these 
changes should then be taken into account in its uses within ancient history. 
 So what can CSR and the Standard Model also do to elucidate the phenomenon? To structure 
the primary material which will feature in the following chapter we must first create a template to 
put it in, which adequately tests the Standard Model for its validity. To do this we shall employ an 
Aristotelian form of causality, otherwise known as: if X then Y. If the model is correct we should 
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expect to see certain elements based on the seven different points in the source material. Or we can 
expect NOT to see certain elements. The first point of the model, religious thoughts as a normal by-
product of cognition, is the first example of this. This point is only meant as a basis for the other 
elements and there is no way to infer this fact from primary material. 
 The second part however, minimally counter-intuitive concepts are the cause of religious 
thought, is certainly important. If this point of the model holds, then we would expect to see 
evidence of the rulers supernatural qualities, or more specifically superhuman qualities and powers. 
If we can see that the ruler is expected, by some/most of his subjects to hold powers that transcend 
human capabilities, then we can say that he is certainly counter-intuitive. Whether or not he is 
minimally so, remains a matter for latter as we cannot quantify and establish this. On the other hand 
we should also expect to find sources that speak against the supernatural qualities of the ruler 
because, as with any religious believe, we should expect to find opposition and disbelieve. 
 The third point of the Standard Model, agency detection to suppose the presence of 
supernatural agents, is not all that relevant of itself. There is after all no need to detect supernatural 
agents as the deified living ruler is a concrete and physical concept. However, in combination with 
the second point, one could argue that it is important, given that the supernatural qualities and 
powers of the ruler must be recognized as such. As with the other gods, actions must be recognized 
as finding their origin in the supernatural/minimally counter-intuitive realm. The living deified ruler 
has the added difficulty that his doings must be perceived as more than human. It would therefore 
be interesting to observe if the actions of the ruler were always thought to be supernatural even if he 
is exercising his ‘normal’ kingly tasks. If the model holds we should expect to see actions or 
happenings that are counter-intuitive (or at the very least unexpected) and see them ascribed to the 
ruler. In other words, are there any supernatural actions/happenings that are thought to be the 
doings of the ruler? On the other hand, on the basis of the second and third point, we would expect 
to see evidence of the ruler worshipped because of his own merits and not because he is the 
manifestation of another god or assimilation with another god.  
 The fourth point holds that morality is strongly connected to the supernatural, supernatural 
concepts that are interested in all our actions and possess punitive powers to enforce morality. This 
point is certainly interesting although it is not the easiest to find in the primary material. It is, after 
all, not all that surprising to find in a ruler the interest and power to enforce morality. To observe this 
it would be interesting to see if we can find the ruler (as a god) safeguarding morality and passing 
judgement. We should also expect to find evidence of the ruler passing judgement as part of this 
kingly duty. However, should we find only this and no reference to the supernatural nature of the 
ruler in enforcing morality, this point would be rather poor. 
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 The fifth point, on rituals for the supernatural, is an interesting point to examine in the 
sources. What was thought to be the point of rituals performed for the supernatural ruler? Did the 
subjects expect a natural outcome, by non-natural means? It would also be interesting to see who 
was expected to properly preform these rituals and where. If the Standard Model holds, then we 
should expect to see people performing the same rituals and expecting the same kind of results as 
those for the gods. 
 The sixth point, the connection between supernatural agents and theories about death and 
other existential implications that find their origin in non-religious sources, will also be excluded from 
our further research as we already established that, to my knowledge, the deified ruler is only 
connected to his own death cult and that of his predecessors in Hellenistic and Roman culture. This 
expression of the ruler cult falls outside of the scope of this research. Powers and influence in the 
afterlife was mostly the domain of other gods. This must not be seen as a problem, because in most 
polytheistic religions there is a division of labour, if you will. There are more gods who have nothing 
to do with death as these tasks were in the domain of another. 
 The final point of the Standard Model, religious concepts are ideally suited for coalitional 
affiliation, is as stated above very important to this research. It would certainly need to be to assure 
that Greek and Macedonian rulers were accepted as rulers in a strange land, the same would hold for 
the Roman emperor. The social consequences of the ruler cult are something we can clearly examine 
in our source material. However, for the point to hold, we would expect to see a clear differentiation 
between believers and non-believers in the ruler cult and also some consequences connected for this 
fact. It is especially important, because a declaration of loyalty to the ruler could immediately be 
seen as a declaration of loyalty to the nation. We would therefore expect some form of endorsement 
for the ruler cult from the rulers themselves. The rulers would certainly not discourage such actions 
as it could result in them endorsing dissention from their nation. 
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Chapter 3: Putting it into practice 
This section of the study is most crucial for the entire research, the culmination and combination of 
all the previous to form the answer to our primary question: is the Cognitive Science of Religion 
useful in looking at historical events and does it enhance our understanding in matters where, up till 
now, there has been no consensus, i.e. the Hellenistic and Roman ruler cult? Unfortunately, 
combining CSR and our primary source material, as is the object of this section, is not as 
straightforward as portrayed above. Following the Standard Model, as indicated above, is indeed a 
preferred method for dealing with the primary material. Although we could run the risk of being 
blind to some sources or forcing some evidence to fit or contradict the model. The alternative would 
be to examine what the general notion of how this historical period worked and examine whether or 
not that picture fits the model. However, this task is near impossible as the notion as to how this 
historical period looked is already influenced by the theories we have contradicted above. There is no 
piece of primary material that has not already been interpreted to fit a theory and that could 
influence how they interact with the model. Therefore where the second option would most likely 
skew the research into speculative territory and would provide little novel material for thought, the 
first option has more possibilities to function. 
 This section has been divided into several others to better structure the argument. The first 
part will concentrate on attestations for the Hellenistic ruler cult, more specifically the Ptolemaic and 
Seleucid cults. The second section will then focus on the Roman ruler cult in the Principate period. In 
both sections we will examine the available sources for the cult and immediately link this to the 
Standard Model of the CSR to examine its validity. Please note that, as indicated above, not all seven 
points of the model will be equally represented below, as not all are significant for our research. I 
shall also attempt to treat the most important sources speaking both for and against the Standard 
Model, however, given the scope of this research, we must necessarily be somewhat concise. 
Section 3.1: Ptolemy and Seleucus 
We shall start our examination with the Ptolemaic and Seleucid rulers. You will recall that in the 
source material for this period not all empires were equally well represented in both the sources and 
modern literature. Whereas the Ptolemaic Empire has a relatively large amount of source material, 
partly due to its dry climate, the Seleucid Empire does not have this luxury. Of course, evidence for 
the Seleucid ruler cult will be used, where it can be found, but the emphasis of this section will 
necessarily lie on Ptolemaic evidence. The evidence for this section is further limited by our definition 
of ruler cult, because this only covers the cult for the living deified ruler and not his predecessors. 
Therefore most evidence which covers the so-called dynastic cult is for the most part useless, except 
where it also concerns the cult for the current rulers. Also, given the scope of this research it will be 
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impossible to address all evidence for the ruler cult, although I shall attempt to be as complete as 
possible. 
 We shall start with the evidence for the second and third point of the Standard Model, as 
these are intimately connected. So, in what way is the Hellenistic ruler counter-intuitive and what 
powers does he or she possess to merit their deification?187 The best evidence to answer this in the 
Ptolemaic Empire are, amongst others, the so-called priestly decrees. These tri-lingual decrees 
(Hieroglyphic, Demotic and Greek) describe the outcomes of a national synod of native priests. The 
structure of the decrees is always the same: they mention the reason for the synod (a major victory 
in battle, coronation or some such) and the decision reached on what type of honour to bestow upon 
the ruler in question. Most importantly, this always includes the form of the royal imagery to be set 
up in the innermost part of the temples of the other gods as temple-sharing gods (sunnaoi theoi).188 
It is therefore very clear that this concerns the current rulers who beget a cult as honour for deeds 
performed.189 These deeds can vary greatly in content, but all apparently justify the foundation of the 
cult for that individual ruler, or (more often) a king and his wife. The Canopus decree, for instance 
speaks of giving Ptolemy III and his sister-wife Berenice, the Theoi Euergetai, a cult because they: 
 
“… care for what concerns Apis and Mnevis, and the rest of the sacred animals which are 
honoured in Egypt, and to expend money and to prepare many things on behalf of the divine 
images which the Persians took away from Egypt –the King having gone to the foreign 
territories, and having captured them and brought them to Egypt, returning them to their 
temples, from which they had been taken in the first place, and having preserved the country 
from strife, by campaigning abroad in the distant places against many foreign countries and 
the men who rule them…” 190 
 
They are also accredited with acting beneficent when a famine struck Egypt, by renouncing their 
claim to many taxes to help ease the peoples suffering and they also shipped copious amounts of 
grain to Egypt to sustain the population.191 The decision is therefore taken by the Egyptian clergy that 
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Ptolemy III and his queen Berenice should be ‘respected in accordance with what is fitting’ and that is 
to provide them both with a cult in the Egyptian temples, which includes sacrifices and participation 
in festivals.192 More reasons are given in the Raphia and Memphis decrees, but they all centre on the 
rulers beneficent actions and strong military power. However, as Hölbl says, given the fact that in the 
Canopus Decree the decision is made to also deify and worship a princess who died in childbirth, one 
can see that it was apparently not always dictated by the expressed powers during life.193 There was 
a ‘intrinsic divinity’ in the royal family, or formulated in the CSR terms, there was apparently 
something counter-intuitive that was indicated or transferred by belonging to the royal family in the 
first place. Not very surprising if one remembers that these were all gods in some form at that time, 
albeit living or dead. 
Given the tri-lingual nature of the decrees one could speculate on their intended audience. 
P.E. Stanwick, for instance, believes these decrees were copied and distributed amongst the other 
priests and officials and were therefore trilingual.194 S. Pfeiffer deduces the intended audience from 
the location of the decrees, which is given in the text of each. Given that the decrees were to be 
placed in the forecourt of the Egyptian temples, it is most likely that the Egyptian population, who 
would gather for religious assemblies, would see them, read them or be told of their contents.195 This 
seems very likely, as the native population of the Ptolemaic Empire was also encouraged to partake 
in the cults for these rulers.196  
 While the priestly decrees are more in the Egyptian sphere, similar ideas can be found for the 
Greeks. There are for instance various examples of a cult for the living Hellenistic ruler in several 
Greek poleis throughout the Mediterranean. To name some, Ptolemy I Soter was worshipped during 
his lifetime by the League of Islanders and by the Rhodians. The establishment of these cults was 
done by the poleis themselves to give thanks and honour that Ptolemy I was due. The decision for 
the League of Islanders is recorded in an inscription from Miletos, a city in Asia Minor, which dates to 
around 262 BC.197 The reasons for this decision are also noted: 
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“… since King Ptolemy (I) Soter (the Saviour) has been responsible for many great blessings to 
the Islanders and the other Greeks, having liberated the cities, restored their laws, 
reestablished to all their ancestral constitution and remitted their taxes… it is fitting that all 
the Islanders, who were the [first] to have honoured Ptolemy Soter with godlike honours 
[both because] of his [public benefactions] and because of his [services] to individuals…” 198 
 
It is clear that the actions recorded here, justified his deification, we must therefore assume that 
they were experienced as something superhuman/minimally counter-intuitive by those in the 
League. Now to us these actions might seem as typical exercising of normal kingly duties, which are 
always, more or less, amazing when viewed from the eyes of the masses. However, in this case it is 
clearly more than that. This difference can be seen in Diodorus’ description of the siege of Rhodes in 
305/4 BC. After the siege was lifted the Rhodians honoured those who had shown bravery in the face 
of danger.199 They set up statues in honour of King Cassander and King Lysimachus, who had helped 
in the salvation of the city, however: 
 
“…But as for Ptolemy, they wished to repay his favour with an even greater one [honour], 
and sent sacred ambassadors to Libya (Africa) to ask the oracle of Ammon whether he 
advised the Rhodians to honour Ptolemy as a god. When the oracle had given its assent they 
consecrated a square enclosure in the city, which they called the Ptolemaeum…” 200 
 
The most interesting thing about this source is, that we can see that there is clearly a difference 
between normal kingly tasks (which is honoured with a statue) and superhuman actions or 
involvement (which is reason for the instigation of a cult). Although the reason for this difference in 
honour is not given, other than establishing that it is warranted. The ruler is not automatically 
thought of as a god, he must earn this status by superhuman actions.201 
In the Seleucid dynasty there is also evidence for what powers or actions made one eligible 
for one’s own cult. Important evidence for this can be found in a letter of a Seleucid governor, which 
also features an edict of Antiochus III. The letter does not concern the instigation of Antiochus’s own 
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cult, but that of his sister. His own had already been established at that time, although the date is 
uncertain.202 The relevant lines run as follows: 
 
“King Antiochus (III) to Menedemus, greetings. Wishing to increase further the honours of 
our sister and Queen Laodice, and believing this to be most imperative for us, / not only 
because of the affection and care she shows in her life with us, but also because of her piety 
towards the deity, we continue to perform affectionately everything that is fitting and just 
[for her] to receive from us, / and in particular it is our decision that just as chief-priests 
(archiereis) of ourselves are appointed throughout the kingdom so too chief-priestesses 
should be set up in the same [provinces]…” 203 
 
Queen Laodice is to receive a cult, the same as her husband, not only because she is kind to 
those around her, but more specifically on account of her piety towards the god(s). It is a theme we 
also saw above for the Ptolemies. Apparently kings and queens can be a special sort of pious, which 
then qualifies them for a cult. Following the Standard Model, there would have to be something 
minimally counter-intuitive about their worship, unfortunately the quoted sources will not allow us 
to establish what this was.204  
There is clearly quite a bit of evidence in the sources on reasons why the living ruler begot his 
cult based on his actions. These powers, which mostly constituted of protecting order, the land and 
its people by military action or by being beneficent. Also being pious in an apparently superlative 
degree was minimally counterintuitive enough to serve as justification in our source material for the 
instigation of a cult. The material examined here is all very public and official in nature and therefore 
has advantages and disadvantages for our research. Given its public nature, the texts are most likely 
fairly representative of what citizens generally thought. It is likely that, if such an inscription 
contained something which was not felt on a large scale, the people responsible would be called out 
on this. Of course, such a text can also serve a formative end, to shape the already existing cognitive 
tendency to view their sovereigns as supernatural beings. This more prescriptive alternative would 
also show an interaction between cognitive basis and cultural support, which could give the final 
nudge into full-blown worship. Another consequence of the public nature of this material is that 
represents no more than a very general overview of opinions and feelings. It is therefore lacking in 
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any details which could provide interesting sentiments to apply to the model. Private and individual 
worship did happen, but motivations are not discussed in such evidence, we shall return to this 
below. However there are far larger issues that must be dealt with because, based on the premises 
of the Standard Model, there are certain things we would not expect to see in the source material. 
Perhaps the most important of this is the ruler receiving a cult, not because of his or her own 
individual merits, but because he or she is a representative of, or assimilated with, another god or 
goddess. For in that case, it is not the rulers themselves who possess counter-intuitive powers, but 
the god who inhabits him or her. Of course, given the fact that not all people on earth have such a 
relationship to a god, makes the rulers special and, arguably, somewhat counter-intuitive. However, 
this does not result in a cult for that ruler specifically, for the counter-intuitive powers recognized 
belonged to another supernatural concept. But is this always the case? Can we always see a clear 
segregation between when it is the ruler as a god in his own right or by the grace of another god’s 
power? 
 There are numerous examples of rulers being worshipped due to their connection with 
another god. P.M. Fraser gives multiple examples for this phenomenon and we shall discuss several 
of these and ones identified by other authors.205 There are cases in which both the ruler and the 
assimilated deity are mentioned. Arsinoe Philadelphus, for instance is on several occasions identified 
with a Cyprian form of Aphrodite already during her lifetime. A single act of commemoration has 
survived in four separate sources, which is a temple commemorated to Arsinoe-Aphrodite by the 
admiral Callicrates. One dedicatory epigram by Posidippus runs as follows: 
 
“…Here Callicrates set me up and called me the shrine of Queen Arsinoe-Aphrodite. Come 
then, ye pure daughters of the Greeks, to her who shall be famous as Zephyyritis, and ye, too, 
toilers on the sea; for the nauarch built this shrine to be a sure harbour from all the waves.” 
206 
 
In this Arsinoe is clearly part of Aphrodite and the powers which she is claimed to have, follow from 
this association. Arsinoe protects the sailors at sea, however, she can only do so because it is what 
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Aphrodite does.207 Another, less clear example, can be seen concerns queen Berenice, wife of 
Ptolemy Euergetes. She dedicated a lock of her hair in the temple of Arsinoe-Aphrodite for the safe 
return of her husband from the Third Syrian War, afterwards the lock disappears but is rediscovered 
as a celestial constellation.208 According to both Hölbl and L. Koenen such a dedication was inspired 
by both Greek and Egyptian precedent.209 Most importantly it is connected to the story of Isis who 
mourns her husband Osiris by dedicating a lock to him. This might seem like a farfetched connection, 
however, when looking at depictions of the queen on seals created to mark the favourable outcome 
of the Third Assyrian War, it becomes clear that it is not. Berenice is clearly depicted with shorn hair 
and bearing fertility attributes of Demeter and Isis.210  She may therefore be partially held 
responsible for the victory of the war, but again because of the powers of another goddess. The 
dedication of the lock only had the desired effect because of the precedent of Isis making a similar 
dedication.211 
 This is not to say that only queens were the subject of assimilation, a similar trend can be 
seen with the Hellenistic kings. Ptolemy Philopator for instance, was frequently identified with 
Dionysus and attributed much of his characteristics.212 The Seleucid kings are also often identified 
with gods, in fact a list of annual priesthoods under Seleucus IV records many examples of kings 
assimilated with other deities. There is for instance a priest for Seleucus (I) Zeus Nicator and 
Antiochus (I) Apollo Soter.213 Following our definition, this is not part of the ruler cult, I believe that it 
is just another form of an already existing cult for a deity. 
 Another issue is that while we have clear evidence that there was a difference between 
kingly actions which warranted a cult and actions which warranted honour but no cult, as was seen 
above. The source material is not conclusive in what actions warrant what, for example there is an 
honorary poem by Syracusan poet Theocritus, who enjoyed royal patronage under Ptolemy II 
Philadelphus. It exalts the virtues of Ptolemy II, including: creating wealth among his people due to 
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his great rule, protecting the nation from invaders and honouring the gods with riches and elaborate 
sacrifices.214 The observant reader will have noticed that several of these actions were already 
mentioned in the priestly decrees above, where they were given as reasons for installing a cult for 
the Ptolemaic ruler. However, in this poem the actions signify that Ptolemy II is worthy of praise, but 
a possible cult as a consequence of these, is nowhere to be found. This apparent display of dissent is 
troublesome, because it clearly shows that what some experience as counter-intuitive powers, 
others do not. While not very surprising as there are also non-believers, it does obscure the evidence 
for the Standard Model. 
There is clearly ample evidence that the Hellenistic ruler was not always deified and 
worshipped because of his own merits. Agency detection, as you will recall from the Standard Model, 
did obviously recognize that the ruler possessed counter-intuitive superhuman powers. Yet, for the 
inhabitants of their kingdoms, it was not always so that they themselves were the source of these 
powers. It is also not clear whether or not ancient men always thought of their rulers as 
supernatural, even when exercising their normal kingly tasks. Could these sources all be written by 
‘non-believers’? It is difficult to say, while these people certainly did find the actions of their rulers 
awe-inspiring, it is not clear whether or not they thought of these actions as superhuman. The source 
material does not allow us to conclude the underlying experience of ancient men when viewing the 
actions of their rulers. Were they simply extraordinary or superhuman and the work of a god 
(whether by the rulers own strength or that of another deity)? In sum, while there is evidence that 
some rulers were thought to possess counter-intuitive/superhuman powers, it is also clear that this is 
not always the case. The same actions could be seen by one as reason for installing a cult and by 
another simply enough to honour him with a statue or a poem. 
 Let us examine the evidence for the next point of the Standard Model, that morality is 
strongly connected to the supernatural. To assess whether or not the ruler was thought to have a 
more then human share in morality we shall examine oaths taken sworn in the name of the ruler. 
These should give us an indication of this matter as these oaths often include a clause which explains 
what will happen in the event that the oath is broken. Let us examine a deed of cession from the 
Ptolemaic period, whose contents consist of the deed and the corresponding royal oath. Theon, son 
of Antiochus swears: 
 
“… by King Ptolemy and Queen Cleopatra also called Tryphaena, gods Philopatores 
Philadelphi, and by their ancestors and the other gods, that I have come to an agreement 
with you Dionysius son of Apollonius… I shall not break the contract nor resort to fraud in any 
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respect regarding the contract of agreement… but if I do not act as aforesaid, I agree that the 
provisions of the cession and agreement are to remain irrefutable, and that when I am 
brought to account the remaining portions of my allotment are to revert to the Crown and 
also I am to be held liable to the consequences of the oath.” 215 
 
Although the oath is clearly sworn to the divine rulers, there is no mention of anything supernatural 
of counter-intuitive in the consequences for not upholding the oath. This is in fact something which 
we continuously see in the oaths where we can reconstruct this clause.216 Another example can be 
seen in P.Sorb I 734, it concerns another individual who swears by the divine rulers and their 
ancestors. He, Agathinos son of Simôn, concludes that if he keeps his oath that he may be happy and 
if he breaks it that the opposite might happen to him.217 Although it is possible that the divine rulers 
might be responsible for his misery if he were to break the oath, no such thing is said explicitly. In 
some oaths it is stated that the Crown should profit from the breaking of the oath, as mentioned 
above, therefore certainly being involved in the punishment of oath breakers.218 However, nowhere 
is it mentioned that people experienced their divine rulers as having full access to strategic 
information. It is therefore rather unclear whether the involvement of the rulers stem from their 
divine nature or just from their place as king, hence it is a rather poor argument in favour of the 
Standard Model. 
The fifth point of the Standard Model concerns rituals, if you will recall, the model holds if we 
see people performing the same rituals and expecting the same kind of results as those for the gods. 
Contrary to the point above, there is ample evidence for the rituals performed for the deified rulers, 
in fact sources for this fact have already been mentioned above when treating the counter-intuitive 
powers of the Hellenistic rulers. To start, let us re-examine one of the Egyptian priestly decrees. 
These clearly indicate that the priests had to perform the same rites for the divine rulers as they 
performed for the other gods in the temples, they would also be carried out during festivals for the 
people to see as would those of the other gods. For instance, in the text of the Raphia decree; 
 
“It has come into the hearts of the priests of the temples of Egypt: to increase the afore-
existing honors rendered in the temples to king Ptolemy, the ever-living, the beloved of Isis, 
and to his Sister, queen Arsinoe, the Father-loving Gods, and those rendered to their parents, 
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the Benefactor Gods, and those rendered to their forefathers, the Gods Adelphoi and the 
Saviour Gods.  
Also a royal statue shall be put up of king Ptolemy… in every several temple, in the most 
conspicuous place in the temple, fashioned according to Egyptian art.  Also they shall cause 
an image of the local God to be shown in the temple and set it up at the table of offerings at 
which the image of the king stands, the god giving the king a sword of victory. The priests 
who are in the temples shall offer homage to the images three times each day and set the 
temple-furniture before them and perform the other things for them, which it is proper to 
do, as is done for the other gods on their festivals and processions and special days… There 
shall be celebrated a festival and a procession in all the temples throughout Egypt for king 
Ptolemy, the ever-living, the beloved of Isis, from the 10th of Pachon, the day whereon the 
king conquered his adversary, for five days each year, with wearing of wreaths and offering 
of burnt offerings and libations and all the other things which it is proper to do, and it shall 
be done according to the beautiful command…” 219 
  
The kings would become so-called sunnaoi theoi, that is: temple-sharing gods.220 In Greek context the 
kings also beget cults similar to those of the gods, or in the Greek term, as Chaniotis tells us isotheoi 
timai (‘honours equal to those bestowed upon the gods’).221 We have also already seen that 
individuals set up temples to worship certain rulers, such as Arsinoe Philadelphus whose temple was 
built by the admiral Callicrates. Even if this temple was, in fact, dedicated to a syncretized version of 
Arsinoe Philadelphus as Arsinoe-Aphrodite it is still an honour/ritual which is also similar to those for 
the gods. There are many examples of temples being built by private individuals and polis to honour 
their rulers similar to the dedications to the gods and, given the supernatural statues ascribed to the 
rulers, probably with the hope for similar results.222 We shall return to this below, but for now let us 
                                                          
219
 English translation of the German text of the Raphia Decree, lines 30-37. H-J. Thissen, Studien zum 
Raphiadekret (Meisenheim am Glan, 1966), 22-23. Something similar can be seen in the Canopus decree in lines 
20-25. For the translation and commentary on the decree see; Pfieffer, Dekret von Kanopos, 101-104. 
220
 E. Winter has assembled chronological lists of where the ancestors are directly worshipped or depicted as 
sunnaoi theoi (temple-sharing gods), but he fails to mention any examples of the veneration of the living rulers. 
E. Winter, ‘Der Herrscherkult in den ägyptischen Ptolemäertempeln’, in: H. Machler and V.M. Strocka ed., Das 
ptolemäische Ägypten. Akten des Internationalen Symposions 27.-29. september 1976 in Berlin (Mains am 
Rhein 1978) 147-160, 149-152. Winter’s earliest example comes from the time of Ptolemy III, in which he offers 
to his deified parents Ptolemy II and Arsinoe II from Karnak. 
221
 Chaniotis, ‘Hellenistic Rulers’, 433. This is deduced based on IG 12.7, 506 and SEG 41.75. He then concludes, 
as was indicated in chapter one, that this meant that the rulers were not truly thought of as divine and that the 
title of theos was only awarded to rulers upon death. Given our evidence from the Ptolemaic rulers, who were 
called theos during their life, we can conclude that this is false. 
222
 For a very extensive overview of honors for Hellenistic rulers in Greece and poleis in Asia-Minor, see: H. 
Kotsidu, Timē kai doxa. Ehrungen für hellenistische Herrscher im griechischen Mutterland und in Kleinasien 
unter besonder Berücksichtigung der archäologischen Denkmäler (Berlin 2000). 
50 
 
examine other rituals performed for the deified rulers, such as festivals. As was already indicated 
above festivals and the rites performed there were also a major part of the ruler cult. These festivals 
were often named after the intended ruler (such as the Ptolemaia) and usually took place on their 
birthday or for another occasion.223 For instance, Ptolemy III received a festival every month on the 
25th to commemorate his ascension to the throne.224 And Seleucus II received the same in Ilion as a 
euangelia (a sacrifice for good tidings).225 The point of all these rituals, similar to those of the gods, is 
the principle of do ut des-principle. The perpetual cycle of reciprocity of exchange between human 
being and deity underlies all interactions in ancient religions.226 By honouring the Hellenistic rulers 
the citizens and polies expected to benefit from the powers of these rulers or perhaps encourage 
them to continue acting as they did when they earned these honours. 
 It was also obviously very important that the rituals were executed by the proper agents. 
There is ample evidence that priests were instituted to oversee the rituals in the temples for the 
deified rulers, even if they were sunnaoi theoi. These were clearly different priests than those for the 
other gods, it must therefore have been the case that the other priests were not sufficient or 
proficient enough to oversee the cult.227 This was most likely not out of practical considerations, 
because the priests would otherwise be too busy, for the execution of the rites would probably be 
done by the same priests as those for the other gods. It is in the higher ranks that we see a 
differentiation for the priests. Take for instance the Raphia decree quoted above. There is no 
differentiation between priests exercising the cultic rituals for the rulers and the other gods. Even if 
the decrees dictate that all priests should now be given the title to be named priests of the rulers, in 
practice the title was only given to some and these were mostly high-ranked priests.228 What does 
this mean for the Standard Model? That is somewhat unclear, on the one hand there is no difference 
in priests exercising the rituals for the deified rulers and those of the other gods, this is only the case 
on the higher levels. However, more importantly, the rites in the temples still had to be exercised by 
priests and not the local farmer. That is not to say that the local farmer did not perform rites to 
honour the rulers, in fact, at least in Ptolemaic Egypt, the population was clearly expected to 
participate in the cult of the divine rulers as much as they were expected to participate in the regular 
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cults of the gods.229 Private worship can be attested in numerous sources. Widespread worship 
amongst the population of Ptolemaic kingdom may be indicated by the vast amount of small 
terracotta busts of Ptolemies that have been found.230 The quality and material suggests that they 
might have been mass-produced for alters in the homes of the population.231 The priestly decrees 
also indicate that it was expected of the population to actively participate in the festivals for the 
rulers or at least that it should be made possible to them.232 
In sum, the dedication and rituals performed for the deified Hellenistic rulers are the same as 
those performed for the gods. This is not very surprising as cognitive science describes rituals as a 
social interaction and an action just as any other, the only difference being that the agent that is 
being motivated to act is supernatural in nature.233 The motivation and form of these offerings must 
therefore be the same as those for the gods as it is based in the same interaction system. The 
interesting element that is added in this case is that the ruler is both a ‘normal’ social actor and a 
supernatural being. The do ut des-principle dictates the interactions of ancient men, both with the 
ruler and with the gods. What can we conclude from this evidence? In this case, our expectations 
based on the perimeters of the Standard Model have been fulfilled. We expected to see people 
performing the same rituals and expecting the same kind of results as those for the gods and we 
have seen nothing less. Let us examine if the next point of the Standard Model fares as well. 
This brings us to the final point of the Standard Model and one of the most important. It 
holds that religious concepts are ideally suited for coalitional affiliation and is one that prominently 
features in the source material. The social function of religion as enforcing a system of hard-to-fake 
and costly signals of commitment can clearly be seen in ancient sources. An example of this comes in 
the form of a dedicatory inscriptions from military troops found in the excavations a temple in 
Hermoupolis Magna.234 It reads: 
 
“The catoecic cavalry serving the Hermoupolite nome [dedicated] the statues, and the 
temple and the other buildings within the sanctuary, and the stoa, to King Ptolemy, the son 
of Ptolemy and Arsinoe, the Theoi Adelphoi, and to queen Berenice, his sister and wife, the 
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Theoi Euergetai, and to Ptolemy and Arsinoe, the Theoi Adelphoi, for their benevolence 
towards them.” 235 
  
This was constructed by a permanent military garrison stationed in the region, with enough funds to 
create this structure. This sanctuary was clearly dedicated to the current ruler, his spouse and their 
parents and is an example of Greek soldiers worshipping their rulers. This example is quite 
exceptional in its magnitude as the construction of an entire sanctuary would be beyond anyone of 
more modest means. We have seen a similar dedication above where admiral Callicrates built his 
temple for Arsinoe. This is a perfect example of a costly and hard-to-fake signs of commitment, as it 
is a very visible and permanent reminder of the loyalty and piety of these soldiers. It might not be 
very surprising to find such a costly declaration of loyalty coming from soldiers, as the fact that they 
are soldiers is already a sign of loyalty towards the Ptolemaic ruler. However there are also other, 
more modest, private dedications to be found all linked to specific members of the Ptolemaic 
dynasty.236 These are often simple plaques dedicated to the ruler, in which his or her divinity is 
explicitly recognized. These were most likely erected at already existing shrines and therefore do not 
record the foundation of them, as others often do.237 These dedications are often rather short and 
the person dedicating them is almost always named in the inscription, which is crucial for our 
investigation. To give two examples of these kinds of dedications, again both by military personnel: 
 
“[to] King Ptolemy and Arsinoe Philadelphus [by] Ptolemaios, the phrourarch and those 
under his command” 238 
 
“To King Ptolemy, God Epiphanes [dedicated by] Kallistratos the commander, and the 
soldiers under his command” 239 
 
 Chaniotis notes that garrisons and soldiers were often the primary bearers of royal ideology, 
especially in the form of the ruler cult.240 They were often the establishers of the cults in dependent 
cities, such as Thera, Itanos and Ephesos.241 Such garrisons ‘reminded the local population that there 
was a divine element inherent in kingship’, according to Chaniotis.242 While I have my doubts about 
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the inherent nature of the divine element, given that we have seen that worship was often thought 
to be earned by the powers displayed by the rulers, it is clear that soldiers served as a reminder for 
these cities of the strength of the rulers. So while we clearly see worship among soldiers is more 
difficult to say whether the population of Egypt worshipped their Ptolemaic rulers in their own 
homes, although the evidence discussed above of the small terracotta busts is compelling. If we 
combine this with statements made in the Memphis decree which was, probably, directed at the 
general public (limited as this may be due to the high illiteracy rate). The relevant lines are as follows: 
 
“… and it should be made possible for the private persons also who will (so) wish, to produce 
the likeness of the shrine of the Manifest God whose excellence is fine, which is (mentioned) 
above, and to keep it in their homes and hold the festivals and the processions which are 
described above, each year, so that it may become known that the inhabitants of Egypt pay 
honour to the Manifest God whose excellence is fine in accordance with what is normally 
done.” 243 
 
It is clear that private worship was something which needed to be addressed as well as the practical 
side of this. At the same time we can see that it was possible that the rulers themselves endorsed the 
private worship of themselves. By giving it specific mention in such a public degree it is clear that 
they were not indifferent towards the phenomenon, otherwise why go through the trouble of letting 
it be known that private worship (in the form of images or participation in festivals) is possible. The 
decrees may have been written in the name of the Egyptian priests, however the involvement of the 
rulers in the synods cannot be denied.244 
 We have clearly seen that the ruler cult could function as a declaration of loyalty to the 
crown, which is probably why such a large amount of soldiers adhered to the cult and spread it 
wherever they were stationed. What we have not seen is a differentiation between believers and 
non-believers in the ruler cult and also some consequences connected for this fact. We have already  
observed above, when examining the powers of the ruler, that it is difficult to assess sometimes 
whether or not we are dealing with a non-believer or someone who just does not say it explicitly. 
There is only one group of which we can be certain that they did not find their ruler divine and those 
are the Jewish people who live under the rule of Hellenistic kings. Kings in Jewish tradition had a 
vastly different role than those in the Hellenistic tradition. Jewish kings functioned purely in the 
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profane sphere, they were no cultic leaders, they did not sacrifice or interpret the will of their God.245 
These tasks were exclusively fulfilled by the priests in the temple though conflicts often broke out 
between the kings and the priests as to who had the ultimate say in matters. This could of course not 
be the case in the Hellenistic kingdoms as the Jewish people had to function in a larger and more 
multicultural society then just their kingdom surrounding Jerusalem. 
 We shall shortly examine two examples from the Ptolemaic and Seleucid kingdoms which 
signify how the Jews interacted with the ruler cult. The most illustrating example, I believe, is how 
Jewish people in Alexandria ‘worshipped’ the Ptolemaic ruler. They could of course not offer directly 
to him, as he was no god in their eyes: there was only one god, while he is simply king. However, the 
cult of the Ptolemaic rulers could not and would not be ignored by the Alexandrian Jews.246 In the 
evidences, from this time, we can observe that a middle way was found which was acceptable for 
both groups. There are numerous plaques found in synagogues which dedicate part of the temple or 
furniture to Yahweh on behalf of the reigning Ptolemy and his spouse.247 The formula ‘on behalf of’ is 
crucial, as it is a loyalty formula which side-steps explicitly stating the divinity of the rulers. This 
excluded them from any other dedication they needed to make, there were for instance, no statues 
of the rulers in synagogues as should be obvious.248 While this was obviously enough for the 
Ptolemaic rulers to satisfy them of the loyalty of the Jews, it was not felt as fair by the Greek segment 
of the population and was a major source of anti-Jewish sentiments. With the risk of getting ahead of 
ourselves, in Roman Alexandria, tensions had risen between the Jews and the Greeks and this 
culminated in an embassy sent to Rome in 40 AD to emperor Caligula. Philo describes the episode; 
the Jews have come to complain to the emperor that they were being harassed by the Greeks while 
they had made all the sacrifices to the emperor which were needed. To which Caligula replied: 
 
“… that all this is true, and that you did sacrifice; nevertheless you sacrificed to another god 
and not for my sake; and then what good did you do me? Moreover you did not sacrifice to 
me." 249 
 
While this is a source from the Roman period, it clearly illustrates that a clear distinction was felt 
between offering to someone or on behalf of someone and that this difference excluded one group 
                                                          
245
 H. Frankfort, Kingship and the gods. A study of the Ancient Near Eastern Religion as the Integration of 
Society and Nature (Chicago 1978), 337-344. 
246
 Fraser, Ptolemaic Alexandria, volume 1, 282. 
247
 Amongst others CPJud. 1432, SB 589, OGIS 726, OGIS 96 and OGIS 101. For a complete overview of these 
dedication: Fraser, Ptolemaic Alexandria, volume 3, 441. 
248
 Philo, Leg. Ad Gai. XX, 137-138. 
249
 Philo, Leg. Ad Gai. XLV, 357. Translation from: C.D. Yonge, The works of Philo Judaeus, the contemporary of 
Josephus (London 1855). 
55 
 
from the general population. The ruler therefore fulfils his final prerequisite, based on the seventh 
point of the Standard Model, a transparent difference between believers and non-believers and 
consequences that follow from this differentiation. To put it in terms of CSR the Jews were seen by 
the Greeks as cheaters in the system, profiting from their worship and dedication to the Ptolemaic 
rulers, without making similar costly signals of commitment.  
 To summarize this section, the Standard Model does not appear to have survived unscathed 
when confronted with the evidence from the Hellenistic kingdoms. This might not entirely be due to 
a fault in the model, but also brought on by difficulties in the source material. When observing what 
the counter-intuitive powers of the rulers were thought to be, it is difficult to explain why one sees 
these powers as reason for deification, while another sees the same and concludes that a different 
kind of honouring is fitting. On the other hand, there is nothing in the model to properly explain why 
some rulers were worshipped only because they were the conduit of another god’s power on earth, 
rather than by their own merit. Another example of troublesome sources was seen when examining 
the oaths. While it was obvious that they were sworn by members of the royal house, they make no 
reference to any kind of supernatural consequences if the oath is broken. It is therefore impossible to 
establish if these actions were thought to be the result of the rulers supernatural nature or simply 
caused by his kingly tasks. When examining the rituals and suitability for coalitional affiliation of the 
Hellenistic ruler cult it appears as if the sources fully support the Standard Model. Altogether it is as 
of yet unclear if the Standard Model can hold up completely. Let us now examine the Roman 
material and see if this changes our preliminary conclusion. 
Section 3.2: Rome’s Princeps 
The Roman imperial material provides us with an interesting view on their ruler cult. Which, on the 
one hand, is somewhat similar to the Hellenistic cult, especially in the provinces, something we shall 
observe below. Yet, on the other hand, it provides us with sometimes confusing material when it 
comes to the existence of a cult for the living ruler in Rome and Italy. The Roman Princeps 
undoubtedly had an extensive connection to the supernatural world. For Augustus for instance there 
is extensive anecdotal material which signifies his connection to the supernatural. His birth is said to 
have been heralded by several omens, these too focus prominently on his divine ancestry.250 Also 
during his lifetime numerous dreams and omens are recorded which concern Augustus’ connection 
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with the supernatural, presenting him as supported by the gods or sent by them.251 Although these 
are literary sources, provided to us by elitist writers who most certainly had an agenda, the 
connection need not be doubted. It is when we wish to examine the cult of the living emperor that 
we run into contradicting evidence and discussion, both in ancient times and with modern scholars. 
Was the emperor part of the supernatural world, rather than only connected to it? In modern 
scholarship it has often been concluded that there is a difference in the worship of the living emperor 
between the provinces and the Italian peninsula, we shall examine both to examine whether this is 
justified. Now, with these preliminary considerations in mind, let us now turn to the application of 
the Standard Model. 
 As we did with the previous section, we shall start with the examination of the counter-
intuitiveness of the Roman rulers and what powers they are thought to possess to merit their 
deification.252 As is tradition in discussing the Roman ruler cult we shall divide our discussion of the 
second and third point below between the provinces and the Italian Peninsula, including Rome. This 
division is not merely a matter of tradition, as we shall observe below, although I shall not adhere to 
it as strictly as some scholars have, as it might obscure more than illuminate.253 Traditionally the view 
was that the ruler cult was a Greek phenomenon and completely alien to the ‘original’ Roman 
culture.254 Although this view is now thought to be old-fashioned, there are still many scholars that 
hold that there was no cult for the living ruler in the Italian Peninsula, though there was a 
longstanding tradition in the East which continued in the Republican and later Imperial periods.255 
This complicates matters for our research, as scholars cannot seem to agree on whether or not there 
was worship of the emperor, let alone what form it took. This is not entirely due to a different 
interpretation of the sources, the Roman material is itself not entirely clear on the matter and 
sometimes even contradictory, nor is it complete. I shall attempt not to take sides in this discussion 
by evaluating their arguments (though sometimes this will be inevitable), however we shall see 
whether their opinions and interpretation can be combined with the Standard Model. 
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 The Roman material is somewhat different in nature from the Hellenistic material above, as it 
rarely states why the emperor deserved to be worshipped. Generally speaking the Roman emperor 
was worshipped in three manners in his realm, although some will disagree with this conclusion.256 
Either he was worshipped, as we have seen above, as a god himself (albeit sometimes assimilated 
with another deity). As we have already established the consequences of this above, we shall be brief 
about this. F. Lozano tells us that the emperor was mostly worshipped for his good and pious deeds 
and for the wealth he brings to the world, this concerns not only physical wealth but also a rich social 
and political life.257 This can, for instance, be seen in a decree from Halicarnassus, which concerns 
honours for Augustus: 
 
“Immortal Nature, after Overwhelming Benefactions, has bestowed on Men the Greatest 
Good of all. She has given us the Emperor Augustus, who is not only the Father of his 
Country, Rome, Giver of Happiness to our Lives, but also the Fatherly God and Saviour of all 
Mankind. It is He whose Providence has not only fulfilled but even surpassed the Prayers of 
all. For Land and Sea lie at Peace and the Cities bloom with the Flowers of Order, Concord 
and Prosperity.” 258 
 
Although there is no mention of cult, we can deduce some minimally counter-intuitive strengths that 
Augustus is thought to have had, these look quite similar to the Hellenistic examples above. He is the 
father and saviour of mankind, a role which is usually in the domain of the gods and thoroughly 
counter-intuitive power for any to have, let alone a human.259 Augustus is also thought to answer, or 
even surpass, the prayers given to him by safeguarding the inhabitants of the Empire. These duties of 
protecting the empire can be seen as part of the emperors standard kingly tasks, yet were also 
clearly part of his superhuman strength.260 Another illustrating example given the reasons why the 
emperor is worshipped comes from another Greek city, Akraiphia: 
 
“Since the lord of the entire world, Nero, pontifex maximus, in his 13th year of tribunician 
power, father of his country, New Apollo that has shone on the Greeks, has decided to 
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bestow benefice upon Greece and has rewarded and shown piety toward our gods, who have 
stood by him everywhere for his care and safety; since he, Nero, Zeus the Liberator, the one 
and only greatest Imperator of our times, friend of the Greeks, has bestowed the eternal 
indigenous, native freedom that had formerly been taken from the Greeks, he has shown his 
favor, he has brought back the autonomy and freedom of the past and to this great and 
unexpected gift has added immunity from taxation, quite complete, which none of the 
previous Augusti gave us. For all these reasons it has been decided by the magistrates and 
councilors, and the people to worship him at the altar dedicated to Zeus the Savior […].” 261 
 
There are several interesting things to be deduced from this decree, the first of course being the 
reasons why the emperor, Nero in this case, should be worshipped. In this we can see something 
very similar to what we observed in the Hellenistic material, that is, the emperor shows great piety 
towards the gods and also great beneficence to the people of the poleis. We can also observe that in 
the exertion of these tasks he is supported by the native pantheon, while at the same time being part 
of it as manifestation of the New Apollo or Zeus the Liberator at which altar he is also going to be 
worshipped. We have already discussed the difficulties of the application of the Standard Model 
when it concerns the assimilation of the ruler with another god, but we can nonetheless see that 
similar reasons are mentioned throughout these two periods.262 However, this is not the only way in 
which the emperor receives worship. 
A second form that the ruler cult takes in the Roman empire, one which was unfamiliar in the 
Hellenistic kingdoms, is the worship of the emperors numen. The term numen means the divine 
power of the emperor. It is a property of an emperor, ‘a divinized abstraction to be treated the same 
way as a traditional god’, yet it can only exist within the emperor.263 Alternatively it can also 
distinguish the divinity and divine power of the Roman gods and characterize their represented 
forces.264 An example of worship of an Imperial numen can be seen in the following inscription from 
an altar in Narbo, Gaul: 
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“May it be good, favorable, and fortunate for Imperator Caesar Augustus, son of the divus, 
[…] and for the colonists and residents of the colony of Iuliu Paterna Narbo Martius, who 
have obligated themselves forever to the worship of his numen.” 265 
 
Unfortunately they do not mention why they have obligated themselves, what it was that Augustus 
did to merit this worship. The text further tells us on which days the inhabitants of Narbo would 
provide sacrifices.266 These dates are not surprising, his birthday and the day he first assumed the 
fasces and, interestingly, on the date that Augustus intervened in a conflict between the inhabitants 
and decurions.267 This last event stands out as it seems of importance for the locals and could 
possibly be the reason for the worship of Augustus, but this interpretation cannot be supported by 
other evidence. A similar structure can be seen in another inscription on an altar, which comes from 
Forum Clodii close to Rome. The inscription, set up in 18 AD, records the regulations of rituals to be 
performed to several members of the Imperial family.268 Several of those mentioned are already 
deceased at the time of the inscription and therefore fall outside of the research, however, the 
current ruler Tiberius is also presented with sacrifices on several days and his genius, which we shall 
return to below, is also invited to partake in other offerings.269 Again, as above, the rituals take place 
on very specific dates, birthdays of Augustus, Tiberius and Livia and also the anniversary of the local 
dedication of statues of the Caesars and Livia. The inscription on the altar mentions no reasons as to 
why the numen of these Caesars is to be worshipped, but interestingly we see a similar division as in 
the other inscription. The dates for the offerings are a combination of celebrations of local and more 
general significance.270 
Although no clear ascription of counter-intuitive aspects can be found leading to the worship 
of the emperors numen, we should not overlook one important aspect. That is, the fact that the 
emperor even possesses numen, something which normally belongs to the gods and their powers, is 
in itself a counter-intuitive quality.271 That we possess as many mentions as we do of the emperors 
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numen, and its often costly worship, is an interesting and striking phenomenon.272 Therefore, even 
the tasks he performs as part of his position as Princeps and a slew of other positions, cannot be 
separated from his internal divine powers. D. Fishwick tells us that although the emperor possessed 
numen during his life, he did not possess the status of a numen. He was not divine, nor a divine 
power.273 However, even he is forced to admit that this difference, which is of prime theological 
significance, probably was not experienced by the bulk of the worshippers. The awkward position has 
also been formulated another way: 
 
“There must have been, in other words, all the difference (and yet almost none at all) 
between worshipping Augustus himself and worshipping his numen.” 274 
 
I. Gradel believes that worship of the numen did not in fact exist and that it was merely a synonym 
for the worship of the emperor himself.275 Whichever the case, the conclusion, that the fact that the 
emperor is even thought to possess a numen can be seen as a minimally counter-intuitive, still 
stands.  
This brings us to the last manner of worship, the cult for the emperors genius, which stands 
almost opposite to the emperors numen. Genius is something which all living men possess, as well as 
the gods.276 It could possibly be used synonymously with numen, although scholars do not agree on 
this interpretation.277 Yet the genius is something which should be seen as separate from a man, it is 
his personal god under whose tutela he or she lives. This genius was seen as a divinity in ancient 
times and worshipped alongside the other gods of the Roman pantheon.278 The genius of an emperor 
was a divinity in his own right and not a divine property of the emperor. Therefore technically it falls 
outside of the definition of ruler cult, for although the genius was intrinsically connected to the 
emperor, it nonetheless was a separate being. That is not to say that this theological difference was 
felt by everyone, in fact, chances are it was not. However, this difference cannot be observed in the 
sources, although there has been speculation that the emperors genius was sometimes seen 
synonymous with his numen, as discussed above. All in all, this is a clear example of the troubles of 
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combining CSR with the ancient source material. For what we wish to see might not be there or only 
there through speculation, which would bring us no further than our theories in the first chapter. In 
sum, we can clearly identify certain minimally counter-intuitive aspects and powers in the ancient 
source material that the emperor was thought to possess. However, there continue to be problems 
with the application of the Standard Model, mostly because of the assimilation problem which we 
saw in the Hellenistic period as well and with the added difficulty that the sources are not all 
unambiguous. This is not just a matter of interpretation, but also because of the influence of culture. 
There is one final aspect of these points of the Standard Model which we have yet to 
address, that is opposition and disbelieve. There is ample evidence of this for the Roman ruler cult 
stemming mostly from the elite layers of the empire, although this might simply be a consequence of 
what sources are preserved. It has led some to conclude that there was no cult in Italy and Rome and 
although this might be true for public worship, private worship was most likely widespread as our 
sources attest.279 The source of this believe is a passage in Cassius Dio: 
 
“He [Caesar Augustus] commanded that the Romans resident in these cities should par 
honour to these two divinities [Roma and Caesar]; but he permitted the aliens, whom he 
styled Hellenes, to consecrate precincts to himself, the Asians to have theirs in Pergamum, 
the Bithynians theirs in Nicomedia. This practice, beginning under him, had been continued 
under other emperors, not only in the case of the Hellenic nations but also in that of all the 
others, in so far as they are subject to the Romans. For in the capital itself and in the rest of 
Italy no emperor, however worthy of renown he has been, has dared to do this; still, even 
there various divine honours are bestowed after their death upon such emperors as have 
ruled uprightly, and, in fact, shrines are built to them.” 280 
 
The text seems quite clear on the matter and has been interpreted that no worship was allowed to 
the living emperor in Italy and Rome. However, archaeological and epigraphical evidence speaks 
against this and shows that there was most certainly a functioning cult for the emperor, which 
constituted worship, temples and priests.281 I. Gradel has, I believe, solved this dichotomy rather 
neatly. He argues that Dio’s outlook is that of the typical Roman historian (although he is himself 
Greek), he is only concerned with state matters and therefore ignores the private sphere from which 
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our other evidence comes.282 Yet this is not the most expressive material for non-believers, as there 
is even evidence of emperors themselves being sceptical of their own divinity.283 Philosophers and 
other elite writers created strict divisions in status between the gods and men and therefore which 
honours were appropriate for which category. Any violation of these categories would bring ire and 
scorn form the elite and sometimes even murder.284 Cultural influences and most importantly dogma 
spark this resistance to the ruler cult. The phenomenon is contradictory to their weltanschauung and 
this triggers their non-believe. However, their experience of the world is often different, in the world 
outside of writing there is a certain flexibility when it comes to belief.285 K. Hopkins formulates it 
thus: 
 
“There was a wide spectrum of values, beliefs and attitudes. At a rational level, several of 
them were probably incompatible, yet in fact held by the same people simultaneously.” 286 
 
D. Fishwick gives several examples of these strange dedication by elites, yet he concludes that if we 
observe these things, we must not take them literally. For instance, when the prefect of Egypt refers 
to Claudius as ‘our god Caesar’, it is a statement meant for those reading it, not a reflection of his 
own opinion.287 I firmly disagree with this assessment and even more with his conclusion that if Jews 
or Christians chose martyrdom rather than give cult to the emperor, that this was a theological error 
on their part.288 We have already clearly seen above, that a clear difference was felt in offering to 
someone or on behalf of someone, with respect to the Jews, and that this difference excluded one 
group from the general population. This cannot have been the case if it was simply a 
misinterpretation of the Jews of theology, they were called out on this difference by the other 
inhabitants of Alexandria.  
All in all, there were certainly disbelievers for the Roman ruler cult and some (perhaps even 
most) were part of the elite in the Roman Empire. This certainly provides us with an interesting view 
in how a cognitive basis can be combined with cultural influences. For instance seen in the flexibility 
of belief in the face of a contradicting worldview. However, this combination does provide us, as it 
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did above, with some questions which the Standard Model cannot easily solve, or at the very least, 
not yet. The issues created by assimilation, which we also saw in the Hellenistic period and the added 
difficulty that the sources are not all unambiguous concerning how the emperor was worshipped. Let 
us continue with the overview of the Standard Model. 
The fourth point, if one recalls, holds that morality is strongly connected to the supernatural, 
supernatural concepts are interested in all our actions and possess punitive powers to enforce 
morality. This can be observed in the Roman material. It would not surprise anyone that oaths similar 
to the Hellenistic ones above, were sworn in name of the Emperor. This seems to be a practice that 
was continued in Roman Egypt and is encountered on several occasions in papyrus texts from 
Egypt.289 The Romans themselves also had a tradition of swearing oaths in the name of gods, for 
instance Jupiter, but never to a living human. According to De Jong oaths, both public and private in 
nature, were in the Imperial period sworn to the divine facets of the emperor, the problematic 
aspects of numen and genius.290 There are several examples of these oaths to be named, which are 
sworn by the emperor as god and in name of several different emperors. The most prominent one is 
Augustus, who is regularly sworn by and is even, on occasion named a god in these oaths as are other 
Julio-Claudian emperors.291 Yet, as with the Hellenistic oaths, it remains unclear whether the 
involvement of the rulers stem from their divine nature or just from their place as king.292 For 
example, this example is given by De Jong, who translates the oath as: 
 
“I swear by Caesar Imperator, son of a god, Zeus Eleutherios Augustus.”293 
 
De Jong indicates that, in this case, it is unclear whether Augustus is assimilated with Zeus or that we 
should see them both separately as guarantors of the oath. Although it is an interesting case there is 
no mention of anything supernatural or counter-intuitive in the consequences for not upholding the 
oath.294 De Jong further identifies two more phases in which these oaths develop, when the imperial 
Tyche is introduced and when this variant takes over completely.295 The Tyche was probably the 
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Greek translation of the genius of the emperor. Therefore her conclusion that oaths were sworn to 
the numen and the genius is based on this later evidence, from around the reign of Vespasian.  
 These oaths provide us with no more evidence then the Hellenistic versions, however, there 
is more material linking the emperor to morality and its safeguarding, although this is equally 
dubious in nature. There is, again according to De Jong, a connection between the temples of the 
imperial cult and the settling of judicial matters.296 That is, as well as being the centre of the cultic 
rituals for the emperor in Egypt, it had another purpose as heart of legal affairs of that particular 
region. However, additionally to this role in legal matters it was also a centre of administration in the 
immediate area. Although it could be that the emperor, in his role as god, presided over both legal 
and administrative matters in Egypt, it seems somewhat unlikely. The matter could be put to rest if 
we could establish whether the priests of the imperial cult were also responsible for the 
administrative tasks of the temple. Unfortunately for the regional cults in Egypt, we are poorly 
informed about the tasks of the priest, as we are equally ill-informed about priesthoods in the 
remainder of the empire.297 The ‘high priest of Alexandria and the whole of Egypt’ who is frequently 
attested in the sources as a Roman of equestrian rank, was most likely responsible for the 
administration of all the temples in Egypt, including the imperial temples.298 However, nowhere is he 
connected with the legal matters settled in the temples. The regional priesthoods can also not be 
connected to the justice system. The temples were most likely the most prominent, visible and 
widespread of Roman power and therefore the focus point of state affairs. It is unclear, and in my 
opinion unlikely, that the presence of a justice system in the temples was brought on by a connection 
with the deified ruler.299 If we take this together with the ambiguous evidence in support of the 
Standard Model, makes this a point which is best left untouched until perhaps more evidence comes 
to light. 
 The fifth point, on rituals for the supernatural, is quite visible in the source material as it was 
above and yields some interesting evidence. If the model holds we shall expect to see people 
performing the same rituals and expecting the same kind of results as those for the gods. We have 
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already discussed several sources, when treating the second and third point of the Standard Model, 
which outline ‘why’ emperors were worshipped, but these also outline the form that the worship 
should take.300 The inscription from Narbo, Gaul, prescribes the dates which are relevant for the cult 
and more importantly what action should be taken on that date and by whom. 
 
“The people of (Gallia) Narbonensis have set up an altar in the forum at Narbo, at which, 
every year on the 9th day before the Kalends of October, on which day the happiness of this 
era proclaimed him as the ruler to the whole world, three Roman Knights from the people 
and three freedmen shall each sacrifice an animal and they shall provide incense and wine, at 
their own expense […] on the 8th day before the Kalends of October, they shall also provide 
incense and wine.” 301 
 
The inscription mentions more dates then these, however these all include the same kinds of 
sacrifice by the same people. The offering of an animal, incense and wine is similar to the cult of the 
gods, although the animal which was offered could differ. It is also interesting to note that the 
sacrifice needed to be performed by the appropriate agents, in this case three Roman knights and 
three freedmen. Supposedly the ritual would otherwise be less effective or perhaps even invalid. 
Although there is no mention of what the intended outcome of this ritual should be, yet it would not 
be a stretch to see its source in the do ut des-principle as we did above. The social interaction with 
the living emperor is based on the same basic assumptions as for those with the gods.302 Further 
evidence for rituals performed for the emperor can be found in multiple calendars that have been 
preserved, these mark certain prominent events in the lives of the emperors and also record days on 
which sacrifices would be made to the emperor and the gods that support him.303 They also recorded 
many other non-imperial festivals, which only makes the case for the Standard Model stronger. The 
fact that there was felt to be no difference between a festival for one of the traditional gods and 
festival in honour of the emperor’s birthday is significant. As we observed above concerning the 
emperors numen this is a telling sign as to the attitudes of the Romans towards their ruler. An 
example of such an calendar is the Feriale Cumanum, which concerns the civic cult of Augustus in 
Cumae, and records numerous rites (supplicationes) to both the traditional gods and Augustus.304 D. 
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Fishwick argues that the emperors could not have been of the same status of the gods, because we 
have no record of prayers to the emperor.  
 
“Yet we have no record that anyone ever said his prayers to the emperor to recover, say, 
from illness, or called on him in the moment of peril, and until we do, it would be a mistake 
to think that Augustus or his successors were ever accorded outright divine veneration.” 305 
 
Aside from the fact that focusing on prayers as a criterion for divinity is quite a Judeo-Christian way 
of looking at things, as there were in fact other manners of cultic veneration that did take place. 
There is also the issue that in the ancient pantheon there was a ‘division of labour’ if you will. 
Different gods had different powers and therefore different responsibilities when it came to the 
needs of the Roman people. One did not pray to Mars for a safe journey at sea, or to Jupiter for a 
successful love-life. It is therefore logical that we would not find any prayers to the emperor asking 
him for health and prayers in a moment of peril are hardly attested in the sources to begin with.306 I 
therefore believe that it would be wrong to assume that the emperors were not viewed as gods 
simply because we would not possess any prayers to them. Especially given the fact that other rituals 
and the locations for these rituals, as we shall observe below, was identical to those of the gods. 
 As for the locations of this rituals, they were often performed on altars and temples, 
especially dedicated to the emperor.307 The most interesting thing to note about these temples is 
that they were virtually indistinguishable from the temples of the traditional gods.308 Hänlein-Schäfer 
has shown in her overview of Augustan temples that standard architectural models were followed in 
the design of the temples, similar to those of the gods.309 Without further inscriptional or 
iconographic evidence on such monuments, they would be indistinguishable from other temples to 
the traditional gods.310 These temples clearly support the statement that the Roman ruler cult was 
similar to the cult of the gods and therefore in full support of the fifth point of the Standard Model.  
In sum, we have observed, as we did above that the emperor was given the same cultic 
reverence of the gods. Although it is sometimes not entirely clear what those offering hoped to 
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achieve, that is what natural consequence they hoped to elicit by non-natural means. While we 
might not possess any prayers to the divine living emperor, this should not mean that he was any 
different from the gods as he might simply have other tasks. The fact that the emperor is no different 
from the traditional gods in his cultic reverence, is further underlined by the fact that his temples are 
indistinguishable from those of the other gods. If not for the inscriptional or iconographic evidence, 
they can be mistaken for any other temple to any other Roman deity. It should be clear that this is 
merely a cursory overview of rituals performed to the emperor, it nonetheless serves to illustrate the 
applicability of the Standard Model in this respect.311 Let us now turn to the final point of the 
Standard Model. 
The seventh point of the Standard Model holds that religious concepts are ideally suited for 
coalitional affiliation. We have numerous examples of costly and hard to fake signals of commitment 
to the divine, living emperor. I believe the most striking example is a contest which was instituted by 
the Asian League, which would grant a crown to the man who could come up with the best proposal 
to adequately honour Augustus.312 The winning proposal came from the proconsul of Asia, Paulus 
Fabius Maximus and was met with much enthusiasm. Part of his proposal is lost, but the outline and 
reasons of his proposal have been preserved. 
 
“[It is difficult to know whether?] of the most divine Caesar is a matter of greater pleasure or 
greater benefit. We could justly consider that day to be equal to the beginning of all things. 
[…] Since on no (other) day could each one receive a starting point more beneficial for 
corporate and personal improvement than the day which has been beneficial to all; 
And since it happens that all the cities of Asia have the same date for entrance into local 
office, which is an arrangement that has clearly been formed according to some divine 
counsel in order that it might be the starting point of honors to Augustus; 
And since it is difficult to give thanks to such benefactions as his unless we devise some new 
manner of reciprocation for each of them; 
And since people could celebrate more gladly the birthday common to all because some 
personal pleasure has been brought to them through (his) rule; 
Therefore, it seems to me that the birthday of the most divine Caesar be the one, uniform 
New Year’s day for all the polities. On that day all will take up their local offices, that is, on 
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the ninth day before the Kalends of October, in order that he might be honored far beyond 
any ceremonies performed for him and that he might rather be distinguished by all, which I 
consider the greatest service rendered by the province. A decree of the koinon of Asia should 
be written encompassing all his virtues, so that the action devised by us for the honour of 
Augustus should endure forever. I will command that the decree, engraved on a stele, be set 
up in the temple, having arranged for the edict to be written in both languages.” 313 
 
While it, interestingly, reconfirms the reasons for worshipping Augustus as a god, that is as a saviour 
and stabilizer of the world and beneficent ruler, it also gives us insight into expression of loyalty. A 
contest of this sort must have been extremely public and on the minds of many people. Citizens of 
the Asiatic province could show their loyalty to Augustus by entering their idea into the contest. This 
show of loyalty was also strongly supported by the members of the Asian League who organized it. It 
is also quite likely that they, or the winning proconsul would have send word to Augustus about the 
contest, further showing their loyalty. The crown awarded to the winner and the fact that people 
would go through the trouble of organizing and participating in the contest all show costly and hard-
to-fake signals of commitment. 
 As with the Hellenistic rulers we also possess many structures that people have dedicated to 
the living ruler to honour him and show commitment. These offerings always emerged on the 
initiative of individuals, acting on their own behalf or on behalf of collegia or as public 
representatives.314 An example of this is a monuments set up at Corduba and Herculaneum, which 
bear the text: 
 
“Sacred to Augustus. Aulus Lucius Proculus and Aulus Lucius Julianus, sons of Aulus, of the 
Menia tribe, to mark [this] dedication, [made] at their own expense, gave a banquet for the 
town councilors and the Augustales.” 315 
 
In this case not only is the monument a declaration of coalition and costly sacrifice to the divine 
emperor, it also records a similar act: the banquet given at their own expense to the town councillors 
and the imperial priests. There are of course far more private dedications to be mentioned in this 
                                                          
313
 OGIS 458, lines 3-30. Translation from: S.J. Friesen, Imperial Cults and the Apocalypse of John. Reading 
Revelation in the Ruins (Oxford 2001). 
314
 Koortbojian, The Divinization of Caesar and Augustus, 159. 
315
 Corduba: CIL II 2197. Herculaneum: AE 1979, 169. Translation from: M. Koortbojian, The Divinization of 
Caesar and Augustus. Precedents, Consequences, Implications (Cambridge 2013). 
69 
 
category, however this is beyond the scope of this research.316 What is important to note that the 
dedicators of these monuments were, unlike in Hellenistic times, not part of the army, although they 
might be part of the imperial administration. There is also evidence for extensive monuments for the 
cult of the emperors in Puteoli, where an astounding imperial presence can be seen in the forum. 
There were two altars, who were both connected with two statue galleries (supposedly with portraits 
of the imperial family) and a chalcidicum Caesonianum and a chalcidicum Octavianum.317 These 
monuments were erected by one of two noble families in Puteoli and this has led I. Gradel to 
conclude that they were ‘virtually’ competing with each other in erecting monuments to the 
emperor.318 They were showing of, not only their wealth, but also their loyalty to their ruler. 
 Loyalty to the emperor was further expressed in an oath of fidelity sworn to the Caesars 
every year on the third of January and other significant days (birthdays and ascensions).319 This oath 
is known from several sources, including the letters of Pliny the Younger, who reports to emperor 
Trajan that: 
 
“We have celebrated, Sir (with those sentiments of joy your virtues so justly merit), the day 
of your accession to the empire, which was also its preservation, imploring the gods to 
preserve you in health and prosperity; for upon your welfare the security and repose of the 
world depends. I renewed at the same time the oath of allegiance at the head of the army, 
which repeated it after me in the usual form, the people of the province zealously concurring 
in the same oath.” 320 
 
The emperor responds with: 
 
“Your letter, my dearest Secundus, was extremely acceptable, as it informed me of the zeal 
and affection with which you, together with the army and the provincials, solemnised the day 
of my accession to the empire.” 321 
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He clearly supports this act of loyalty to his person, it would be strange if he did not after all. 
However, so far the oath looks like it has little to do with the ruler cult and is simply a declaration of 
loyalty to a ruler. Yet, when seen in context it becomes clear that it is certainly connected to the 
divine ruler. The pledge was usually accompanied by festivities and rituals to mark other honours in 
the imperial worship.322 The pressure of the environment to participate in such events would most 
likely be large and any non-participants and non-believers would immediately stand out. We had 
already mentioned the Roman Jews when dealing with the Hellenistic non-believers above, but it is 
an example worth repeating in this context. Another group which did not participate in the ruler cult 
for the Roman emperor were, of course, the Christians. They were also placed outside of society due 
to their non-conformant behaviour and general lack of signals of commitment, not only in respect to 
the divinity of the ruler.323 The Roman evidence is therefore fully in support of this final point in the 
Standard Model. We can observe clear and costly signals of commitment from the citizens of the 
Roman Empire and we can see a transparent difference between believers and non-believers and 
consequences that follow from this differentiation. 
 Of course, as one might suspect from the length of this section, the mentioned evidence is 
incomplete. I have tried to give a sufficient overview and to address material both in support and 
against the Standard Model of CSR to assess its strength. Although this is by no means every 
argument which can be raised and there is certainly far more work to be done. Yet, for now, let us 
examine what we can conclude from this survey of the Roman material. Let us first remark that, 
while it is at times quite similar to the Hellenistic material, some clear differences come to light. We 
run into the same issues with the Standard Model when the assimilated form of the Roman emperor 
is examined, as this cannot be properly explained. Although there are certainly minimally counter-
intuitive powers and attributes that are ascribed to the emperor, we are also left with numerous 
questions as to how exactly the emperor was worshipped and by what graces he was thought to do 
so. The different values and interpretations given to the concepts of numen and genius, already in 
antiquity, give rise to confusion in assessing the material now. All in all it provides an interesting case 
study for the influence of culture on a cognitive basis and would be interesting to explore further. 
When examining the connection of the ruler with morality, we are again left with similar problems as 
with the Hellenistic material. That is, it remains unclear whether the involvement of the rulers stem 
from their divine nature or just from their place as king. Although it is possible that the emperor, in 
his role as god, presided over both legal and administrative matters in Egypt, it seems somewhat 
unlikely. The possible connection between the imperial temples and their role in the criminal justice 
system does not seem brought on by a connection with the deified ruler. The cultic rituals performed 
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for the emperor were the same as those performed for the gods and executed in similar temples. 
This fifth point of the Standard Model seems to be in complete accordance with the expectations 
expressed. This can also be said about the final point of the model about coalitional affiliation. There 
is ample evidence for public expressions of loyalty to the divine emperor, mostly accompanied by 
various costly sacrifices to further signify participation in the system and this is encouraged by the 
emperor. It is significant to note that these declarations do not all find their origin in the army, as 
with the Hellenistic declarations, but a great range of participants can be seen. There is also a clear 
differentiation between believers and non-believers and for some groups this could have extreme 
consequences. 
This concludes our survey of the Standard Model in Hellenistic and Roman times and 
although it did not survive unscathed, there are certainly interesting conclusions which we can 
deduce. 
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Conclusion: 
How does religion come to be? The origin of religion is a hotly debated issue, logically, as the answer 
has some far reaching consequences for, arguably, the entire world. This discussion has many camps 
and while not all are equally scientific, there are certain aspects which cannot be denied in these 
theories. Religion functions as a giver of information, even if the construction needed to sustain this 
is very extensive. Religion can provide comfort, it does alleviate fears even when it might partly cause 
them. Religion is also surely connected to the functioning of society and morality and this could play 
a part in how we acquire it. Finally, religion is present in this world because it lies within human 
nature that we are prone to believing in supernatural elements. With the exception of this final 
point, all others are functionalistic in their approach. They try to deduce why religion is present by 
examining which roles it fulfils, but while these all play a part, it cannot be their origin. The origin 
should lie in human nature and it is this school of thought which is central to the Cognitive Science of 
Religion (CSR). CSR bases its theories on general laws that follow out of the manner our brain is 
structured. These laws should be applicable across culture and across time, given that the structure 
of the brain remains the same. So is this the case? Can we apply CSR to historical questions and learn 
more than what we know now, or create consensus where there has been none? This has been the 
question which has prompted this research.  
We have tried to answer this question by taking a case study of a new religious phenomenon 
which came into prominence in the third century BC, the cult for the living ruler. A cult for living 
persons had, until then, been a sporadic occurrence, but with the advent of the Hellenistic kingdoms 
became institutionalized and increasingly widespread. The practice was also taken up by the Roman 
emperors, where new developments were taken up in the cult. Current theories on the matter have 
offered no consensus as to how this phenomenon came into existence and why it flourished as it did. 
There are those who see continuity with the period before the Hellenistic. According to them the 
phenomenon is therefore fairly easily explained as ancient men simply experienced divinity in a 
different manner then we do now. The perceived contradiction within and the newness of, the ruler 
cult are of our own creation. Contradicting them are those who believe that there certainly is 
discontinuity, but they offer different reasons why such a fundamental switch in thinking could have 
come to pass. These theories all raise more questions than they answer and are all in some manner 
inadequate. The fact that divinity is not as absolute as we, in our modern perception, often perceive 
it to be, is a recurrent theme for several scholars. This is a very easy way to explain the phenomenon 
by simply chalking it up to a different way of thinking, too far removed from us both temporal and 
culturally to understand. However, evidence suggests that the worshipping of a mortal individual as a 
god is felt to be something vastly different than anything they had practiced before and was 
sometimes found to be an undesirable action. On the other hand there are authors are scholars who 
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claim that the transition to worshipping living rulers as gods was a fundamental change indeed and 
employ copious amounts of source material to support this. However, their arguments are too 
limited in scale to be applicable across the board and deny the influence or accessibility of the 
religious sphere of ancient men, or even deny the existence of the divine ruler. Both are unfounded 
and needlessly limiting, although present interesting evidence for non-participants or alternative 
forms of the ruler cult. 
The Cognitive Science of Religion offers a Standard Model of the most empirically supported 
thesis and it focusses on the most important factor in CSR, the belief in supernatural agents. This 
Standard Model is a seven point construct which was first described by Boyer and has since then 
served as the basis for many expositions on the matter. The model is not, yet, in its final from but its 
current points will allow for an overview in the primary material to assess its usefulness. The first 
point of this model is the fact that religious concepts are incredibly successful and inferentially rich 
by-products of normal brain functions. Meaning that there is no specific area in the brain that 
processes religious thoughts. Religious concepts are those that the brain finds most ‘exciting’. That is, 
these kinds of thoughts trigger several parts of our brain, they are therefore more memorable and fit 
more easily into our expectation. The second point holds that we react strongly to minimally counter-
intuitive inferences about the world. These concepts must violate our expectations only minimally to 
be both believable and transferable. Too many counter-intuitive violation and the concept quickly 
becomes unbelievable and therefore not very likely to be picked up by many people and across 
cultures. Although it is not entirely clear where the difference lies between minimally counter-
intuitive concepts and simply counter-intuitive ones, it is an important point in the model. The third 
point of the Standard Model dictates that Agency Detection leads to suppositions about the presence 
of supernatural agents. This evolutionary trait that ascribes agency to events around us can be 
hyperactive and has a tendency to jump to conclusions about the presence of agencies. We then 
infer the presence of supernatural agents to ascribe responsibility of the unexplainable and find their 
human mentality behind these events. By inferring the presence of supernatural agents we ascribe 
them agency and therefore mentality as these beings are perceived to take an active part in our lives. 
The fourth point follows from this and holds that given the fact supernatural agents possess agency, 
we make assumptions as to their intentions for us. We perceive supernatural agents as having full 
access to strategic information, which is why they often possess some form of punitive power as they 
have a vested interest in morality. The fifth point is that religious rituals are constrained by agency 
assumptions. The goal of this social interaction with the supernatural (the ritual) is to bring about a 
natural consequence by non-natural means. There is often no logical connection between the action 
and its consequence and therefore the influence of a supernatural agent is inferred. The sixth 
consensus in the Standard Model says that religious ideas and concepts are connected to theories 
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about death and other existential implications that find their origin in non-religious sources and are 
therefore so widespread. The final point of the Standard Model says that religious concepts are 
ideally suited for coalitional affiliation, because they provide a clear set of markers that separate one 
social group from another and the whole group had a shared commitment to costly activities. 
Showing signals of religious commitment indicates that you are part of the cooperating group and 
provides status that matches the amount of sacrifice that has been made. 
With the help of this Standard Model we could then deduce certain markers which must be 
seen in the sources from the Hellenistic and Roman material, for the model to hold true. Yet not all 
points are equally relevant for this research and some have been left out. The first point provides the 
cognitive basis for the theory and can impossibly be observed in the source material. However, the 
second and third find ample representation in the Hellenistic and Roman material. Based on the 
model we expect to find evidence that the ruler is expected, by some/most of his subjects to hold 
powers that transcend human capabilities. His acting and his being must be perceived as counter-
intuitive in certain manners. In the Hellenistic and Roman material there is ample evidence for this, 
although for some it was not always the case that the rulers themselves were the source of these 
counter-intuitive powers. They could be assimilated with various other gods who would then be the 
source of their power and worship. This cannot be explained by the Standard Model. There are also 
additional difficulties in the Roman material as they themselves were not clear on whether the 
emperor was worshipped or which section of him and if these theological differences were thought 
to be equally experienced throughout the empire. However, given the nature of the sources and 
their contents seem to insinuate that the emperor was placed amongst the gods in his divine 
qualities (numen) and his worship. 
If the fourth point of the Standard Model holds true, then we should expect to find the ruler, 
as a god, safeguarding morality and passing judgement. Not only as part of his kingly duties, but with 
a specific connection to the supernatural. While we see oaths in both Hellenistic and Roman times 
which were sworn to the divine ruler, it remains unclear whether this has anything to do with their 
divine judicial powers or simply their place as king. They are nowhere said to possess full access to 
strategic information. In Roman times there was a link with the imperial temples and judicial matters, 
which were settled there, but I believe that this was rather due to the fact that the temples were the 
most prominent, visible and widespread of Roman power and therefore the focus point of state 
affairs. 
For the fifth point we should expect to see expectations for the natural outcome of rituals by 
non-natural means. We should also expect that the persons executing the ritual and the locations 
would not differ from those for the cult of the gods. We see both in Hellenistic and Roman times that 
the same social interaction system for the gods underlies the rituals for the divine ruler, the do ut 
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des-principle. It was also crucial for the rituals to be performed by the right actors and these were 
usually prescribed beforehand. Both priests and other individuals were needed in the cult for the 
living ruler, which differed not from the cult for the other gods. This is further underlined by the fact 
that the emperor’s temples are indistinguishable from those of the other gods. This point finds full 
support in the source material. 
The sixth point of the Standard Model falls outside the scope of our research as it does not 
conform to the pre-established definition for the ruler cult as a Hellenistic or Roman ruler who is 
viewed as a god and consequently receives some manner of cultic honouring during his lifetime. The 
seventh point however is crucial for this research. We should expect to see a clear differentiation 
between believers and non-believers in the ruler cult and also some consequences connected to this 
fact. We would also expect some form of endorsement for the ruler cult from the rulers themselves. 
We can observe many costly sacrifices made by inhabitants of the Hellenistic and Roman nations, 
which clearly signify their loyalty to the king or emperor we can also observe the ruler supporting 
these actions, as we would expect. In the Hellenistic period we mostly observe private dedications 
set up by soldiers and garrisons, while in the Roman era we observe all manner of individuals, acting 
on their own behalf or on behalf of collegia or as public representatives, setting up costly dedications 
to signal their loyalty. We can also see a clear differentiation between believers and non-believers 
and consequences for this. The clearest example of this are the Jewish and Christian people, who 
would not participate in the ruler cults and would suffer persecution and exclusion from society, at 
least partly, based on this fact. 
All in all we can clearly observe that some points of the Standard Model find extensive 
representation in the ancient source material, while others cannot be found at all or what is found, 
can be unexplainable. What does this mean for our main question, how useful are cognitive theories 
in looking at historical events? And do they enhance our understanding in matters where, up till now, 
there has been no consensus? We must remember that CSR can provide and explain a cognitive basis 
for religious concepts, but it cannot account for their specific expression in different cultural 
contexts. It can suggest the templates or forms religion can take, but why and how they become 
widespread and successful remains a matter of cultural circumstances. The Standard Model has 
limited success in recognizing and therefore explaining the religious phenomenon of the ruler cult for 
the living king or emperor. This can mean one of two things, either the model is incomplete or our 
sources are of such a nature that they are inadequate. We can adept the model, however, the 
sources are what they are and can therefore not be at fault. Although they may present us with 
troubles in interpreting them, as well as being incomplete and perhaps provide a limited perspective. 
While it is undeniable that the model is not in its final form and should be expanded, with 
both more detail and more empirical evidence, it also lacks explaining power. Elements such as the 
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assimilated ruler, who begets his cult solely by his association with another deity, cannot be properly 
explained in the current model. On the other hand, we must recognize that the model can only 
provide us with very broad perimeters in which to put our evidence and we must not expect 
everything to be explainable through it. The fact that the Romans worshipped their divine emperor in 
several different manners, which are not at all clear categories or even followed unanimously, should 
be recognized as a cultural variation on the cognitive basis and not a refutation. There are obvious 
issues with the sources as well, we are limited to (sometimes) only a hand full of source material and 
these usually offer only the view of the elite on a matter.  
It is my believe that the Standard Model of CSR certainly has a lot of potential, but must first 
be supported in all its facets by material from Hellenistic and Roman times, before we would be 
justified in using it as a tool for explanation in several religious phenomena. By further researching 
religious phenomena, other than the ruler cult, in these eras we can hope to find more support for 
the Standard Model. If all facets of the Standard Model can be located within the source material, we 
could use its contents to enlighten certain phenomena for which we lack the materials. Yet only on 
the level of the cognitive basis and not its specific form which it takes under the influence of that 
specific culture. Or if we cannot find the support, await a new model which perhaps is up to the 
challenge, for the underlying thought remains solid. If we can assess the general tendencies of the 
brain when dealing with supernatural phenomena, which is based on its structure, then whatever 
holds true now should hold true in other cultures and in other ages.  
The current model, or the possibly adjusted model, would then also need further support 
from other cultures and throughout time, for the Greco-Roman culture bears some similarity to our 
own (even if the native aspects of the ruler cult do not). Also, as stated, the model would need more 
explanatory power for other phenomena and therefore on the modern end of the spectrum research 
would also need to continue, as I am sure it will. A final complicated possibility is that CSR and the 
Standard Model focus on religion in general and not the individual expressions of religions as a plural, 
such is the entire point of the model. However, it is in its individual expression that religion is 
influenced most by culture and will therefore show discrepancies or variations with the model. It 
could therefore be that the Standard Model can never be used as an explanatory model for such 
expressions. We should be aware of this possibility in further researching the possibilities of CSR and 
the Standard Model. For now, it is too early to apply the Standard Model of CSR to matters in Ancient 
History where there has been no consensus, but this was only one of the first forays into the 
combination of the two and signs so far are promising and beg further investigation. 
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